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PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE EFFICIENCY GAP
82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
Eric M. McGhee**

The usual legal story about partisan gerrymandering is relentlessly
pessimistic. The courts did not even recognize the cause of action until the 1980s;
they have never struck down a district plan on this basis; and four sitting Justices
want to vacate the field altogether. The Supreme Court’s most recent
gerrymandering decision, however, is the most encouraging development in this
area in a generation. Several Justices expressed interest in the concept of
partisan symmetry—the idea that a plan should treat the major parties
symmetrically in terms of the conversion of votes to seats—and suggested that it
could be shaped into a legal test.
In this Article, we take the Justices at their word. First, we introduce a new
measure of partisan symmetry: the efficiency gap. It represents the difference
between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total
number of votes cast. It captures, in a single tidy number, all of the packing and
cracking decisions that go into a district plan. It also is superior to the metric of
gerrymandering, partisan bias, that litigants and scholars have used until now.
Partisan bias can be calculated only by shifting votes to simulate a hypothetical
tied election. The efficiency gap eliminates the need for such counterfactual
analysis.
Second, we compute the efficiency gap for congressional and state house
plans between 1972 and 2012. Over this period as a whole, the typical plan was
fairly balanced and neither party enjoyed a systematic advantage. But in recent
years—and peaking in the 2012 election—plans have exhibited steadily larger
and more pro-Republican gaps. In fact, the plans in effect today are the most
extreme gerrymanders in modern history. And what is more, several likely will
remain extreme for the remainder of the decade, as indicated by our sensitivity
testing.
Finally, we explain how the efficiency gap could be converted into doctrine.
We propose setting thresholds above which plans would be presumptively
unconstitutional: two seats for congressional plans and eight percent for state
house plans, but only if the plans probably will stay unbalanced for the rest of the
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cycle. Plans with gaps above these thresholds would be unlawful unless states
could show that the gaps either resulted from the consistent application of
legitimate policies, or were inevitable due to the states’ political geography. This
approach would neatly slice the Gordian knot the Court has tied for itself,
explicitly replying to the Court’s “unanswerable question” of “how much
political . . . effect is too much.”
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1
I.

THE DOCTRINAL OPPORTUNITY ......................................................................6
A. Pre-LULAC ................................................................................................6
B. LULAC ......................................................................................................8
C. Post-LULAC ............................................................................................11
II. THE EFFICIENCY GAP.....................................................................................14
A. Definition and Computation ....................................................................14
B. Key Properties .........................................................................................16
C. Comparison to Partisan Bias ...................................................................18
D. Limitations ..............................................................................................25
III. GERRYMANDERING OVER TIME AND SPACE ..................................................28
A. Summary Statistics ..................................................................................29
B. Individual Plans .......................................................................................34
C. Gerrymandering Litigation ......................................................................36
IV. A POTENTIAL TEST ........................................................................................39
A. Setting the Threshold...............................................................................40
B. Presumptive Validity and Invalidity........................................................44
C. Concerns and Responses .........................................................................48
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................51
INTRODUCTION
Cass Sunstein once quipped that the non-delegation doctrine (which purports
to limit congressional delegations of authority to agencies) “has had one good
year, and 211 bad ones.”1 According to the conventional wisdom, the cause of
action for partisan gerrymandering2 has not had even this one good year. The
claim was not recognized until 1986, when the Supreme Court ruled that
gerrymandering is justiciable but still upheld a pair of Indiana district plans that
used every trick in the book to disadvantage the state’s Democrats.3 Since 1986,
not a single plaintiff has managed to persuade a court to strike down a plan on

1

Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
We note at the outset that, consistent with the metric we introduce in this Article, whenever we refer to
“gerrymandering,” we mean district plans whose electoral consequences are asymmetric. We do not mean plans
that were devised with partisan intent. Our conception of gerrymandering is strictly effects-based.
3
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-43 (1986).
2
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this basis.4 By our count, claimants’ record over this generation-long period is
roughly zero wins and fifty losses.5 And adding insult to injury, a majority of the
Court rejected almost every conceivable test for gerrymandering in 2004, and a
plurality would have extricated the judiciary from this domain altogether.6
But the gloomy conventional wisdom is not quite right. In the Court’s most
recent gerrymandering case, LULAC v. Perry,7 several Justices expressed
surprising enthusiasm for the concept of partisan symmetry—the idea, that is,
that a district plan should treat the major parties symmetrically with respect to the
conversion of votes to seats. Justice Stevens raved that symmetry is “widely
accepted by scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral
systems.”8 Justice Souter noted that “[i]nterest in exploring this notion is
evident.”9 And, most remarkably of all, Justice Kennedy declared that he did not
“discount[] its utility in redistricting planning and litigation.”10 These comments,
overlooked by almost all scholars and litigants in the aftermath of LULAC,11 are
the most promising development in this area in decades. They provide the
motivation for our effort, in this Article, to introduce a new measure of partisan
symmetry and to show how it could be fashioned into a workable judicial
standard.
We dub our new measure the efficiency gap.12 It represents the difference
between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—where a vote is
wasted if it is cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate but in excess
of what she needed to prevail. Large numbers of votes commonly are cast for
losing candidates as a result of the time-honored gerrymandering technique of
“cracking.” Likewise, excessive votes often are cast for winning candidates
thanks to the equally age-old mechanism of “packing.” The efficiency gap
essentially aggregates all of a district plan’s cracking and packing choices into a
single tidy number.
An example should illustrate the intuitiveness of our measure. Take a state
with 10 districts of 100 voters each, in which Party A wins 55% of the statewide
vote (i.e., 550 votes). Assume also that Party A wins 70 votes in districts 1-3, 54

4
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n all of the cases we are
aware of involving [redistricting], relief was denied.”); see also infra Section I.C.
5
This count is different from the one we mention in Section III.C, infra, because there we only consider
challenges to the congressional and state house plans in our study.
6
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277-306 (plurality opinion).
7
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
8
Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9
Id. at 473 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10
Id. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
11
To our knowledge, the only scholars to have seized on this language are Bernard Grofman and Gary
King, the political scientists who familiarized the Court with partisan symmetry in an important amicus brief in
LULAC. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King et al. in Support of Neither Party, LULAC v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (U.S. 2006) (No. 05-204) [hereinafter King et al. Brief]; see also Bernard Grofman & Gary King,
The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6
ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007). As we discuss below, no plaintiffs since LULAC have argued for the adoption of a
partisan symmetry test. See infra Section I.C.
12
In the political science article in which he previously discussed the concept, McGhee referred to it as
relative wasted votes. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems,
39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 68 (2014).
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votes in districts 4-8, and 35 votes in districts 9 and 10, and that the remaining
votes are won by Party B. Then Party A wastes 20 votes in districts 1-3, 4 votes
in districts 4-8, and 35 votes in districts 9-10. Similarly, Party B wastes 30 votes
in districts 1-3, 46 votes in districts 4-8, and 15 votes in districts 9-10.13 In sum,
Party A wastes 150 votes and Party B wastes 350 votes. The difference between
the parties’ wasted votes is 200, which when divided by 1000 total votes
produces an efficiency gap of 20%. Algebraically, this means that Party A won
20% (or 2) more seats than it would have had the parties wasted equal numbers
of votes.
In our view, the efficiency gap is superior to the measure of partisan
symmetry—partisan bias—that the Court considered in LULAC.14 (Partisan bias
refers to the divergence in the share of seats that each party would win given the
same share, typically 50%, of the statewide vote.15) The crucial problem with
partisan bias is that it is calculated using a hypothetical election result rather than
the actual election outcome. To determine how many seats a party would win if it
received 50% of the statewide vote, the party’s actual vote shares in each district
are shifted by the difference between 50% and the party’s actual statewide vote
share. Above, for example, Party A’s vote shares in each district would be
reduced by 5% (since it won 55% of the statewide vote), while Party B’s vote
shares would be increased by 5%.
This shifting is troubling for several reasons. First, it relies on what is known
as the uniform swing assumption, the premise that vote-switchers are present in
equal numbers in each district.16 Given the clustering that characterizes modern
residential patterns,17 this assumption is often inaccurate. Second, it is fanciful in
many cases to consider what might happen if the parties’ statewide vote shares
were both 50% (let alone if they flipped, as another common formulation of
partisan bias supposes18). In states like Massachusetts or Utah, shifts of this
magnitude are so improbable that they yield useless results. And third, even in
more competitive states, shifting can give rise to odd conclusions. Above, for
instance, Party A would lose 7 out of 10 districts if its vote share in each district
swung uniformly downward by 5%. This means the plan has a partisan bias of
20% against Party A—even though Party A won 8 of the 10 districts in the
election that actually occurred.
Turning from the abstract to the concrete, what efficiency gaps have current
and historical district plans exhibited? We computed the gaps for all states with

13
All of these wasted vote figures are per district. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that 50 votes
are needed to win a district, not 51. Using 51 votes as the threshold instead, the efficiency gap is 20.6% in favor
of Party A. See also infra fig. 1 (going through this calculation in greater detail).
14
See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 464-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
partisan bias).
15
See id. at 466.
16
See infra Section II.C.
17
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV 1903, 1915 (2012) (discussing
Tobler’s Law, which states that clustering is an almost universal geographic phenomenon).
18
See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 8 (“[I]f a party is able to muster a certain fraction of votes, then
it should get the same number of seats as the other party would if that party had received the same voter
support.”).
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at least eight congressional districts, and all state house plans for which results
were available, for all elections from 1972 to 2012. This represents the most
comprehensive dataset ever assembled to study gerrymandering in the modern
era.19 We found, first, that both the congressional and the state house
distributions had median efficiency gaps of close to zero and were roughly
symmetric in shape. Contrary to claims that Republicans benefit from
redistricting because of their more efficient spatial allocation,20 the typical plan in
recent decades has not been notably skewed in either party’s favor. Second,
however, we also documented an alarming rise in the efficiency gap in the 2012
election. At the congressional level, the average plan had an absolute gap of 0.94
seats in the 1970s and 1980s, 1.09 seats in the 1990s and 2000s, and 1.58 seats in
2012. At the state house level, the average plan had an absolute gap of 4.73% in
the 1970s and 1980s, 5.21% in the 1990s and 2000s, and 6.53% in 2012.21 The
severity of today’s gerrymandering is therefore historically unprecedented.
Third, we decomposed the data into a series of charts showing, for each
decade, each plan’s average efficiency gap as well as how the gap varied from
election to election. (For current plans, we illustrate how the gap would change
given shifts in voter sentiment derived from historical data.) These charts confirm
the account of the efficiency gap centering around zero overall, but rising rapidly
in recent years. They also reveal that many plans’ gaps vary substantially over
the plans’ lifetimes. In many cases, in fact, a plan whose average gap favors one
party will feature a gap favoring the other party at some point during the decade.
Lastly, the charts make it possible, for the first time, to identify gerrymanders
that are both severe and entrenched. In the current cycle, for example, the
Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia congressional plans have gaps of at
least two seats that are unlikely to dissipate given plausible changes in voters’
preferences. Likewise, the Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
state house plans have gaps of at least eight percent that also are unlikely to fade
away in future elections.
The efficiency gap, then, is both superior to partisan bias and easily
calculable across states and over time. It also could be converted
straightforwardly into doctrine. In LULAC, Justice Stevens suggested that the
Court’s approach to one person, one vote claims could serve as a template for a
test for gerrymandering.22 This is a very auspicious analogy, in our view. First,

19
For noteworthy examples of works studying gerrymandering in earlier periods, see GARY W. COX &
JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002), Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through
Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541 (1994), and Gary King & Robert X. Browning,
Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251 (1987).
20
See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013).
21
These figures all are absolute values. We use raw seats for Congress and seat shares for state houses
throughout the Article, for reasons detailed below. See infra Section III.A.
22
See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 468 & n.9 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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just as in that domain there is a population deviation threshold (ten percent)
above which plans are presumptively unlawful and below which they are
presumptively valid,23 so too could key levels be specified in the gerrymandering
context. To take into account both the severity and the durability of
gerrymanders, we recommend setting the bar at two seats for congressional plans
and eight percent for state house plans—with the added caveat that the plans not
be expected, based on sensitivity testing, ever to have an efficiency gap of zero
over their lifetimes. At present, these thresholds would result in the plans named
above being deemed presumptively unconstitutional.24
Second, just as a state may rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality in a
one person, one vote case,25 so too should it have the chance to mount a defense
in a gerrymandering dispute. In the former context, the presumption is rebutted if
the state shows that its plan’s population inequality resulted from the consistent
application of a legitimate redistricting policy.26 The same sort of showing should
suffice in the gerrymandering context, as should a demonstration that no plan
with a smaller efficiency gap could have been drawn due to the state’s underlying
political geography. At this doctrinal stage, of course, cartographic evidence
would be crucial. The state would try to prove that no map with a smaller gap
was possible while still accomplishing its other objectives. The plaintiff, for its
part, would strive to produce a map that attained the state’s goals to the same
extent but that featured a smaller gap. Success by the plaintiff would result in the
presumption continuing to bind.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the doctrinal opportunity
created by the Court’s positive comments about partisan symmetry in LULAC.
Interestingly, this opportunity remains unexplored eight years after the decision.
Part II defines our new measure of partisan symmetry, the efficiency gap, and
discusses some of its useful properties. It also compares the efficiency gap to
partisan bias and identifies some of the gap’s limitations. Part III presents
empirical evidence about the efficiency gaps of congressional and state house
plans over the 1972-2012 period. It highlights as well the gaps of plans that have
given rise to gerrymandering litigation. Lastly, Part IV develops one option for
incorporating the efficiency gap into a doctrinal test. In the first stage of the
analysis, a plan’s gap would be compared to the legal threshold; in the second
stage, a state could argue that a gap above the threshold was unavoidable.
One final introductory point about this Article’s timeliness: Though many
plans continue to be fair, the problem of gerrymandering has never been worse in
modern American history. The efficiency gaps of today’s most egregious plans
dwarf those of their predecessors in earlier cycles. We therefore find ourselves at
a historical moment not unlike that confronted by the Court in the 1960s. Just as
in that era population deviations had skyrocketed thanks to urbanization and

23

See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
That is, the Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia congressional plans, and the Indiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin state house plans.
25
See, e.g., id.
26
See, e.g., id.
24
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district lines left untouched for decades, so too have today’s efficiency gaps
reached new heights thanks largely to advances in technology and unbridled
partisan aggression. Two generations ago, the Court moved decisively to end the
scourge of malapportionment. In our view, the time has come for it to do the
same with gerrymandering.
I.

THE DOCTRINAL OPPORTUNITY

Up until recently, there would have been no reason for us to write this
Article. Just about every potential partisan gerrymandering standard already had
been proposed to—and rejected by—the Court. But in LULAC, for the first time
in twenty years, five Justices suggested they were open to adopting a
gerrymandering standard. In particular, they wrote favorably about the concept of
partisan symmetry, the idea that a district plan should treat the major parties
symmetrically with respect to the conversion of votes to seats. Surprisingly,
though, not a single gerrymandering plaintiff since LULAC has argued for the
implementation of a partisan symmetry test. The doctrinal opportunity created by
LULAC thus remains open and judicially uncharted.
In this Part, we define the contours of this opportunity. We first survey the
Court’s case law prior to LULAC, whose two highlights were the tentative
embrace of a standard that no plaintiff could meet in Davis v. Bandemer,
followed by the rejection of almost every conceivable test in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
We next highlight the promising comments about partisan symmetry made by a
majority of the Court in LULAC. But we also identify the concerns expressed
about symmetry by Justice Kennedy—concerns we believe the standard we set
forth in Part IV fully addresses. Lastly, we summarize the Sisyphean efforts of
gerrymandering plaintiffs in the years since LULAC. We offer some speculation
too as to why these plaintiffs may have failed to seize the opening presented by
the Court.
A. Pre-LULAC
Although there were scattered hints in earlier Court decisions,27 the 1983
case of Karcher v. Daggett28 marked the first time a Justice wrote explicitly
about partisan gerrymandering. A majority of the Court resolved the dispute
purely on one person, one vote grounds, striking down New Jersey’s
congressional plan because of its total population deviation of 0.7%.29 But in a
concurrence, Justice Stevens contended that the plan actually should have been
invalidated because it was a pro-Democratic gerrymander.30 His proposed

27
See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)
(suggesting that a district plan might be invalid if it “would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population” (emphasis added)).
28
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
29
See id. at 731-44.
30
See id. at 744-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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approach for identifying unlawful gerrymanders was to examine (1) “whether the
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group,” (2)
“whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity,” and (3) “whether the
State is able to produce convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves
neutral, legitimate interests of the community as a whole.”31
Just three years after Karcher, the full Court turned its attention to
gerrymandering in Bandemer.32 Six Justices agreed that gerrymandering was not
a “political question” but rather a “justiciable controversy” fully amenable to
resolution by the courts.33 But the majority splintered with respect to the
applicable standard as well as the fate of the Indiana state legislative plans before
it. A plurality held that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system . . . will consistently degrade . . . a group of voters’ influence on
the political process as a whole,” and concluded that the Indiana plans did not
meet this demanding standard.34 In contrast, Justice Powell argued for a totalityof-circumstances test similar to the one advocated by Justice Stevens in
Karcher.35 District compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and the
propriety of the redistricting process were the key factors to consider—and, in his
view, they all revealed the Indiana plans’ illegality.36
In the eighteen years between Bandemer and the Justices’ next foray into this
doctrinal terrain, not a single plaintiff managed to convince a court to strike down
a district plan on partisan gerrymandering grounds.37 The trouble for claimants
was twofold. First, Bandemer’s requirement that a plan “consistently degrade”
voters’ influence meant that challenges brought prior to the first election under a
plan, or even after one or two elections, universally failed.38 Courts simply could
not be sure that a party’s electoral disadvantage would be durable rather than
transient.39 Second, Bandemer’s reference to voters’ influence “on the political
process as a whole” convinced many courts that electoral disadvantage alone was
not enough to call a plan into question.40 Losses at the polls had to be combined
with efforts to prevent a party’s supporters from registering or voting—efforts
that typically did not occur in this era.41

31

Id. at 751.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
33
Id. at 118.
34
Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
35
See id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36
See id. at 173-85.
37
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n all of the cases we are
aware of involving that most common form of political gerrymandering [i.e., the drawing of district lines], relief
was denied.”).
38
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
39
See, e.g., La Porte Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cty. of La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126,
1128 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiffs have not offered to prove that the districts in La Porte County have frustrated
the will of a majority (or even a minority) of voters, for even one election.”); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392,
396 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 664 (Md. 1993).
40
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
41
See, e.g., Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (three-judge court);
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1040 (D. Md. 1994) (three-judge
court); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court) (“[N]or are there allegations
32
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When the Court rejoined the fray in Vieth, a plurality invoked plaintiffs’
dismal post-Bandemer record as a rationale for declaring all partisan
gerrymandering to be non-justiciable. “[Bandemer’s] application has almost
invariably produced the same result . . . as would have obtained if the question
were non-justiciable: Judicial intervention has been refused.”42 The plurality
(joined here by Justice Kennedy43) also rejected every putative standard
suggested by the Bandemer Court, the appellants, and the dissenting Justices.
Both the Bandemer plurality’s approach and that of Justice Powell were
judicially unmanageable, in the Vieth plurality’s view.44 So too was the
appellants’ proposal of (1) predominant partisan intent, (2) systematic “packing”
and “cracking” of a party’s voters, and (3) a party’s inability to translate a
majority of votes into a majority of seats.45 And so too were Justice Stevens’s
intent-based test,46 Justice Souter’s elaborate five-part framework focused on
disregard for traditional districting principles,47 and Justice Breyer’s minority
entrenchment standard.48
But Vieth did not close the door entirely on partisan gerrymandering claims.
Justice Kennedy declined to join the plurality’s justiciability holding, meaning
that gerrymandering remains a viable cause of action even after the decision—
albeit without any test for courts to apply. In his separate opinion, Justice
Kennedy lamented that “the parties have not shown us, and I have not been able
to discover . . . . statements of principled, well-accepted rules of fairness that
should govern districting.”49 The unspoken predicate is that if such rules were
brought to his attention, he would be willing to consider adopting them. 50 Justice
Kennedy also speculated that the First Amendment may prove a more fertile
source for gerrymandering standards than the Equal Protection Clause.51 And
most importantly for our purposes, neither the plurality nor Justice Kennedy
made any critical comments about the concept of partisan symmetry. (Though it
was not, of course, before them in the case.)
B. LULAC
Partisan symmetry was before the Court when it next tackled
gerrymandering, in LULAC, thanks to an amicus brief submitted by a group of

that anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or
campaigning.”).
42
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (plurality opinion).
43
See id. at 308 (“The plurality demonstrates the shortcomings of the other standards that have been
considered to date.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
44
See id. at 281-84, 290-91 (plurality opinion).
45
See id. at 284-90.
46
See id. at 292-95.
47
See id. at 295-98.
48
See id. at 299-301.
49
Id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
50
See also id. at 312-13 (commenting that “new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that
make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of
voters and parties”).
51
See id. at 314-16.
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political scientists.52 And remarkably, given the pessimism in Vieth that any
standard could be found, a majority of the Justices (including Justice Kennedy)
went out of their way to express their interest in the idea. We thus agree with two
of the brief’s authors, Bernard Grofman and Gary King, that LULAC “marks a
potential sea change in how the Supreme Court adjudicates partisan
gerrymandering claims.”53 But we caution that Justice Kennedy also voiced a
number of misgivings about symmetry. These misgivings must be addressed
before it can become the basis for judicial intervention in this area.
Justice Stevens was by far the most avid advocate of partisan symmetry in
LULAC.54 He first defined the term as a “‘require[ment] that the electoral system
treat similarly-situated parties equally.’”55 This also is how we conceive of
symmetry: It is satisfied when a district plan does not discriminate between the
parties with respect to the conversion of votes to seats, and vice versa. Justice
Stevens next observed that symmetry is “widely accepted by scholars as
providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems.”56 He then
proceeded to apply one particular measure of partisan symmetry, partisan bias,
to the Texas congressional plan at issue.57 Partisan bias refers to the divergence
in the share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the
statewide vote.58 Because Republicans likely would have won twenty of Texas’s
thirty-two seats (62.5%) if they had received 50% of the statewide vote, leaving
only twelve seats for Democrats (37.5%), Texas’s plan had a pro-Republican bias
of 12.5%.59 It “constituted a significant departure from the symmetry standard”
and, in Justice Stevens’s view, should have been struck down for this reason.60
Justice Stevens also offered two suggestions for how the concept of
symmetry could be converted into doctrine. First, the Court could hold that a
sufficiently large deviation from symmetry (he floated 10% as a possibility)
“create[s] a prima facie case of an unconstitutional gerrymander.”61 The burden
then would shift to the state to present a legitimate justification for its highly
asymmetric plan.62 This two-step sequence, it bears noting, is nearly identical to
the Court’s framework for one person, one vote claims at the state legislative

52

See King et al. Brief, supra note 11.
Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 4.
54
Of course, neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Souter, who also expressed interest in partisan symmetry
in LULAC, is still on the Court. Their replacements’ views on the subject are not yet known. But if the usual
ideological lines hold, then it is likely that Justice Kennedy remains the swing vote on this issue.
55
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting King et al.
Brief, supra note 11, at 4-5).
56
Id.
57
See id. at 467-68.
58
See id. at 466.
59
See id. at 465-68.
60
Id. at 467; see also id. at 466 (concluding that Texas’s plan is “inconsistent with the symmetry standard,
a measure social scientists use to assess partisan bias”).
61
Id. at 468 n.9.
62
See id. at 468 (“When a redistricting map imposes such a significant disadvantage on a politically
salient group of voters, the State should shoulder the burden of defending the map.”).
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level.63 Second, the Court could make a departure from symmetry “one relevant
factor in analyzing whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a districting
plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.”64 This proposal is perhaps too
close for comfort to some of the tests rejected in Vieth,65 but it also bears some
resemblance to the Court’s methodology in vote dilution cases under the Voting
Rights Act.66
The other members of the Court’s left wing did not quite share Justice
Stevens’s excitement, but they all made positive comments about partisan
symmetry too. Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) noted the “utility of a
criterion of symmetry as a test” and remarked that “[i]nterest in exploring this
notion is evident.”67 He added, “Perhaps further attention could be devoted to the
administrability of such a criterion at all levels of redistricting and its review.”68
Similarly, Justice Breyer joined portions of Justice Stevens’s opinion69 and
referred favorably to the empirical evidence on symmetry that he marshaled.70
Justice Breyer further observed, disapprovingly, that deviations from symmetry
may cause a plan to “produce a majority of congressional representatives even if
the favored party receives only a minority of popular votes.”71
This leaves us, as we are often left, with the Court’s swing Justice, Justice
Kennedy. To the surprise of almost every observer, he expressed in LULAC at
least some openness to the use of partisan symmetry as a test for gerrymandering.
In the key sentence of his opinion, he wrote that he did not “altogether discount[]
its utility in redistricting planning and litigation.”72 Other Justices immediately
seized on this language. Justice Stevens “appreciate[d] Justice Kennedy’s leaving
the door open to the use of the standard in future cases.”73 Likewise, Justice
Souter cited this passage when he commented that “[i]nterest in exploring this
notion is evident.”74
But Justice Kennedy also raised several serious concerns about symmetry.
First, he observed that “[t]he existence or degree of asymmetry may in large part
depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers . . . reside.”75 In other
words, to determine how symmetric a plan is, at least using the partisan bias

63
See id. (citing one person, one vote precedents such as Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), and
Larios v. Cox, 542 U.S. 947 (2004)).
64
See id. at 468 n.9.
65
Not surprisingly, it is especially similar to Justice Powell’s approach in Bandemer—which Justice
Stevens endorsed, and which was based on Justice Stevens’s own opinion in Karcher. See supra notes 35-36.
66
The final stage of a vote dilution challenge is a multifactor totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79-80 (1986).
67
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68
Id. In some respects, this Article can be seen as a response to Justice Souter’s call for further analysis of
the administrability of partisan symmetry.
69
See id. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70
See id. at 491-92 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
Id. at 492.
72
Id. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
73
Id. at 468 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74
Id. at 483-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75
Id. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also id. (noting existence of “different models of shifting voter
preferences”).
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metric, it is necessary to estimate the results of a hypothetical election in which
certain voters switch their ballots from one party to the other. This estimation
requires assumptions to be made about where these vote-switchers are located—
assumptions that are controversial and often incorrect.76 Second, Justice Kennedy
was wary of invalidating a plan “based on unfair results that would occur in a
hypothetical state of affairs.”77 His preference was to wait until an election
actually had occurred and the asymmetry had become concrete rather than
conjectural. As he wrote, “a challenge could be litigated if and when the feared
inequity arose.”78
Third, Justice Kennedy was unsure how to select an asymmetry threshold
below which a plan would be upheld and above which a plan would be
presumptively unlawful. Neither the parties nor the political scientists’ amicus
brief provided the Court with empirical data about the asymmetry of current or
historical plans. In the absence of such data, he did not see how the Court could
choose “a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much.”79
Finally, Justice Kennedy did not believe that asymmetry should constitute the
entirety of the Court’s test for gerrymandering. Asymmetry can be produced by
factors other than a desire to disadvantage one’s political opponents, including
the geographic distribution of the parties’ supporters and compliance with
traditional redistricting criteria such as compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest.80 Therefore, “asymmetry
alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”81
C. Post-LULAC
In the wake of LULAC, one might have expected gerrymandering plaintiffs
to pounce on the opportunity presented by the Court. As Grofman and King
wrote shortly after the decision, “Now that members of the Supreme Court have
singled out the deviation from partisan symmetry . . . we anticipate that there will
be new partisan gerrymandering challenges brought.”82 But this prediction turned

76
The specific assumption that typically is made to calculate partisan bias is uniform partisan swing. The
assumption stipulates that parties’ district-specific vote shares change (or “swing”) by the same margin as their
statewide vote shares. For example, if Democrats received 45% of the vote in a state, and a researcher wanted to
know how many seats they would have won if they had received 50%, the researcher simply would add 5% to
the actual Democratic vote share in each district. The assumption often generates accurate seat share estimates,
but still is considered “neither theoretically nor empirically satisfying” by political scientists. Simon Jackman,
Measuring Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 335 (1994). We discuss the
assumption in greater detail in Section II.C, infra.
77
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
78
Id.
79
Id.; see also id. at 468 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (responding that “it is
this Court, not proponents of the symmetry standard, that has the judicial obligation to answer the question of
how much unfairness is too much”).
80
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f we
were to demand that congressional districts take a particular shape, we could not assure the parties that this
criterion, neutral enough on its face, would not in fact benefit one political party over another.”).
81
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added).
82
Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 33.
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out to be incorrect. Plaintiffs did file multiple gerrymandering suits in the most
recent cycle of redistricting litigation, but not one of them even referred to—
much less argued for the adoption of—partisan symmetry as the relevant
standard. Why not? The likely explanations are inattention to the Court’s
gerrymandering precedents, ignorance of quantitative political science
methodology, and fatalism about the viability of this cause of action. But
whatever the reason, the fact remains that, years after its creation, a sterling
doctrinal opportunity is still unexplored by the courts and available for the
taking.
By our count, plaintiffs in eight states brought partisan gerrymandering
challenges against congressional or state legislative district plans during the 2010
cycle.83 Some of these claimants suggested tests very similar to the ones the
Court rejected in Vieth. For example, the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
argued that “[t]raditional or neutral districting principles may not be subordinated
in a dominant fashion by . . . partisan interests”—a formulation essentially
identical to Justice Stevens’s.84 Other groups, most notably Illinois’s League of
Women Voters, tried to convert Justice Kennedy’s exposition on the First
Amendment in Vieth into a workable standard. These efforts all failed for the
simple reason that district plans “do[] not prevent any [party] member from
engaging in any political speech.”85
Still other plaintiffs, in particular Illinois’s Republican Party, advocated
oddly specific effects tests based on their states’ unique political circumstances.
Not surprisingly, the courts declined to constitutionalize inquiries such as
whether a plan “keeps at least 10 percent more constituents of Democratic
incumbents in the same district as their representative than it does constituents of
Republican incumbents”86 or whether “[m]ore than two-thirds of incumbent
pairings pit minority-party incumbents against each other.”87 A final set of
claimants admitted their own befuddlement, made no proposals at all, and
beseeched the courts to “‘treat partisan gerrymandering cases much like

83
See Perez v. Perry, 2014 WL 2740352, at *9-11 (June 17, 2014); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Ala.,
___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 3976626, at *7 (M.D. Ala. 2013); Baldus v. Members of Wisc. Gov’t
Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854 (E.D. Wis. 2012); Committee for a Fair and Balanced Map v. Ill.
State Bd. of Elec., 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567-79 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 90304 (D. Md. 2011); Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elec., 2011 WL 5868225, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2011)
[Radogno II]; League of Women Voters v. Quinn, 2011 WL 5143044, at *1-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011);
Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elec., 2011 WL 5025251, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011) [Radogno I]; Perez v.
Texas, 2011 WL 9160142, at *10-11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2011); Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35, 41-42 (Mo.
2012); Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230, 1254 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2012); State ex rel.
Cooper v. Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368, 390 (W. Va. 2012).
84
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 2013 WL 3976626, at *7; see also, e.g., Radogno II, 2011 WL 5868225,
at *4 (proposing multifactor test focused on disregard for traditional districting principles that is very similar to
Justice Souter’s in Vieth).
85
League of Women Voters, 2011 WL 5143044, at *4; see also, e.g., Radogno I, 2011 WL 5025251, at *7
(“But what is the connection between the alleged burden imposed on Plaintiffs’ ability to elect their preferred
candidate and a restriction on their freedom of political expression? There is none.”).
86
Committee for a Fair and Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
87
Radogno II, 2011 WL 5868225, at *4; see also id. (“Why the two-thirds requirement for incumbent
pairings as opposed to three-fifths or three-quarters?”).
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obscenity cases—courts will know one when they see one.’”88 Predictably, the
courts turned down this invitation.
Why has no plaintiff since LULAC argued for a partisan symmetry test? We
can only speculate, but several possibilities come to mind. First, many lawyers
simply may not have noticed the favorable comments about symmetry in
LULAC. The bulk of the decision dealt not with gerrymandering but with racial
vote dilution,89 and even the gerrymandering portions were more concerned with
the mid-decade timing of Texas’s redistricting than with the plan’s asymmetry. 90
Moreover, Justice Kennedy did write that “asymmetry alone is not a reliable
measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”91 We believe—consistent with Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter’s comments92—that Justice Kennedy remains open to
the adoption of a symmetry test, but this subtlety easily may have escaped less
attentive (or obsessive) readers.
Second, the measure of partisan asymmetry applied by Justice Stevens in
LULAC, partisan bias, is not particularly easy to compute. In its simplest form,
the measure requires data about each party’s vote share in each district in a plan,
followed by use of the uniform swing assumption to determine each party’s seat
share at a hypothetical vote share point.93 In the more sophisticated version
recommended by Grofman and King, the uniform swing assumption is relaxed so
that each district’s shift is drawn from a random distribution, and multiple
regressions are employed to predict district outcomes from historical electoral
data.94 None of this analysis is overly difficult for political scientists, but it is
hardly intuitive for lawyers. Understandably, plaintiffs may have shied away
from quantitative metrics they did not fully understand.
Lastly, a cloud of defeatism hangs over the cause of action for partisan
gerrymandering, perhaps prompting plaintiffs not to press such claims too
vigorously. As noted earlier, not a single claimant was able to convince a court to
strike down a district plan on gerrymandering grounds during the eighteen years
between Bandemer and Vieth.95 In the decade since Vieth, plaintiffs’ record has
been equally dismal: failure after failure with nary a single success.96 Faced with
such relentlessly negative precedent, aggrieved parties in the post-LULAC era
may have included gerrymandering claims in their complaints, reasoning that
they could do no harm, but then chosen not to pursue these claims with much

88
Perez, 2011 WL 9160142, at *11; see also, e.g., Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 854; Fletcher, 831 F. Supp.
2d at 904; Gonzalez, 53 A.3d at 1254 (“In sum, plaintiffs have not articulated any way in which the process or
its results violated their rights under the Federal Constitution.”).
89
See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423-47 (2006) (portions of majority opinion dealing with vote
dilution).
90
See id. at 413-18, 421-23 (portions of majority opinion dealing with mid-decade timing of redistricting).
91
Id. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
92
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
93
See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 10-11; see also, e.g. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The
Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 684 (2013) (calculating partisan bias in
this way).
94
See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 11-14.
95
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
96
See supra note 83.
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enthusiasm. Other redistricting theories (such as unequal district population,
racial vote dilution, and racial gerrymandering) have much higher success rates,
and plaintiffs accordingly may have focused their energies on them.
Ultimately, the reason why plaintiffs have failed to argue for the adoption of
a partisan symmetry test is immaterial for our purposes. The key facts are simply
that a majority of the Court expressed interest in symmetry in LULAC, and that
nothing has happened since LULAC to reduce the attractiveness of this doctrinal
opportunity. In the next Part, we introduce a new measure of partisan symmetry,
the efficiency gap, that we believe is superior to the partisan bias metric applied
by Justice Stevens in LULAC. It addresses many of the concerns raised by Justice
Kennedy, while more directly capturing the essence of the harm that is caused by
gerrymandering. If and when plaintiffs recognize the opening presented to them
by the Court, they should press for the efficiency gap, not partisan bias, to be
used as the judicial test in this domain.
II. THE EFFICIENCY GAP
The key insight underlying the efficiency gap is that all elections in singlemember districts produce large numbers of wasted votes. Some voters cast their
ballots for losing candidates (and so are “cracked”). Other voters cast their
ballots for winning candidates but in excess of what the candidates needed to
prevail (and so are “packed”). A gerrymander is simply a district plan that results
in one party wasting many more votes than its adversary. And the efficiency gap
indicates the magnitude of the divergence between the parties’ respective wasted
votes. It aggregates all of a plan’s cracking and packing choices into a single
number.
We begin this Part by defining the efficiency gap more formally and
explaining how it is calculated. In brief, the difference between the parties’
respective wasted votes is divided by the total number of votes cast, thus
generating an easily interpretable percentage. Next, we explore some of the
efficiency gap’s interesting properties. Under typical conditions, the only figures
needed to compute the gap are a party’s vote margin and seat margin in an
election. In addition, a gap of zero implies that a given increase in a party’s vote
share produces a twofold increase in the party’s seat share. We then compare the
efficiency gap to partisan bias. While the metrics converge in a tied election, the
efficiency gap is superior in other circumstances because it does not require the
results of hypothetical races to be estimated. Finally, we identify and address
some of the gap’s limitations. In particular, the lopsided elections than can give
rise to odd conclusions are very rare, the gap’s volatility can be taken into
account through sensitivity testing, and uncontested seats can be addressed using
certain reasonable assumptions.
A. Definition and Computation
Our analysis begins with the premise that the goal of a partisan gerrymander
is to win as many seats as possible given a certain number of votes. To
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accomplish this aim, a party must ensure that its votes translate into seats more
“efficiently” than do those of its opponent. In the sort of plurality-rule, singlemember-district (SMD) elections that are almost universal in American politics,
“inefficiency” means votes that do not directly contribute to victory. Thus, any
vote for a losing candidate is wasted by definition, but so too is any vote beyond
the 50% threshold needed (in a two-candidate race) to win a seat. If these
supporters could be moved through redistricting to a different seat, they could
help the party claim that seat as well without changing the outcome in the seat
from which they were moved.
As a practical matter, there are always many inefficient votes in any SMD
system. (In fact, exactly half the votes in each district are wasted in a twocandidate race.97) But a gerrymandering party does not need to eliminate all of its
inefficient votes. It only needs to end up with fewer wasted votes than the
opposition by winning its seats by smaller margins on average. The opposition is
left winning a small number of seats by large margins, and losing a large number
of seats where it claims many votes but still falls short of victory. The strategies
that produce these results are often called “cracking” (splitting a party’s
supporters between districts so they fall shy of a majority in each one) and
“packing” (stuffing remaining supporters in a small number of districts that they
win handily). Though the nuances vary, some kind of packing and cracking is
how all partisan gerrymanders are constructed.98
The efficiency gap, then, is simply the difference between the parties’
respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in the
election.99 Wasted votes include both “lost” votes (those cast for a losing
candidate) and “surplus votes” (those cast for a winning candidate but in excess
of what she needed to prevail). Each party’s wasted votes are totaled, one sum is
subtracted from the other, and then, for the sake of comparability across systems,
this difference is divided by the total number of votes cast. Figure 1 below shows
how this calculation is carried out for the hypothetical district plan discussed in
the Introduction.100 The bottom line is that there are 200 fewer wasted votes for
Party A than for Party B (out of 1000 total votes), resulting in an efficiency gap
of 20% in Party A’s favor.101

97
This is because victory in a two-candidate race is achieved with 50% of the vote (plus one). All other
votes are cast either for the losing candidate or for the winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to
prevail. Assume, for example, that Candidate A receives 65% of the vote and Candidate B receives 35%. Then
15% of Candidate A’s votes and 35% of Candidate B’s votes are wasted—totaling 50%.
98
A sizeable literature has articulated different strategies for achieving more successful partisan
gerrymanders, but the ultimate objective is always to claim a larger efficiency gap in a party’s favor—on
average, or for a given expected future set of outcomes. See, e.g., John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden,
Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 113 (2008); Guillermo Owen
& Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5 (1988).
99
See McGhee, supra note 12, at 68 (expressing this idea algebraically).
100
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101
As in the Introduction, we assume that 50 votes, not 51, are needed to win a district. Again, the
efficiency gap with a 51-vote threshold is 20.6% in favor of Party A. See id.
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FIGURE 1: CALCULATION OF EFFICIENCY GAP
District

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

Party A
Total
Votes
70
70
70
54
54
54
54
54
35
35
550

Party B
Total
Votes
30
30
30
46
46
46
46
46
65
65
450

Party A
Lost
Votes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
35
35
70

Party B
Lost
Votes
30
30
30
46
46
46
46
46
0
0
320

Party A
Surplus
Votes
20
20
20
4
4
4
4
4
0
0
80

Party B
Surplus
Votes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
15
30

Party A
Wasted
Votes
20
20
20
4
4
4
4
4
35
35
150

The efficiency gap is the bedrock of both our positive and normative
approaches in this Article. As a positive matter, we believe the gap is the essence
of what critics have in mind when they refer to partisan gerrymandering. They
typically conceive of gerrymandering as the systematic disadvantaging of a party
through the cracking and packing of its supporters.102 A gerrymandering metric
ought to capture this concept directly, and the efficiency gap does so. At its core,
it is nothing more than a tally of all the cracking and packing decisions in a
district plan.
Normatively, the efficiency gap identifies a concrete harm worthy of judicial
intervention. A gap in a party’s favor enables the party to claim more seats,
relative to a zero-gap plan, without claiming more votes. After voters have
decided which party they support—based on whatever criteria they choose,
including the attractiveness of each party’s policy agenda—the votes cast by
supporters of the gerrymandering party translate more effectively into
representation and policy than do those cast by the opposing party’s supporters.
The gerrymandering party enjoys a political advantage not because of its greater
popularity, but rather because of the configuration of district lines. The parties do
not compete on a level playing field.
B. Key Properties
Beyond its positive and normative appeal, the efficiency gap has a number of
useful properties that warrant discussion. First, under circumstances that are very
common in U.S. elections, it is unnecessary to sum the wasted votes in each
individual district—a process that can be somewhat cumbersome. Instead, if we
assume that all districts are equal in population (which is constitutionally

102

See infra note 121.

Party B
Wasted
Votes
30
30
30
46
46
46
46
46
15
15
350
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required), and that there are only two parties (which is typical in SMD systems),
then the computation reduces through simple algebra to something quite
straightforward:103
Efficiency Gap = Seat Margin – (2 x Vote Margin)
In this formula, “Seat Margin” is the share of all seats held by a party, minus
50%. “Vote Margin” is the same for votes: the share received by a party, minus
50%. A party has an electoral advantage when the efficiency gap is positive, and
a disadvantage when it is negative.104 When the number is equal to zero, there is
no efficiency gap and so no partisan benefit derived from redistricting.
Consider once again the example from Figure 1. Party A received 55% of the
statewide vote (550 out of 1000 votes), and with this support won eight of the ten
seats (80%). The plan’s efficiency gap thus is (80% – 50%) – 2 x (55% – 50%) =
20%. This is the same figure we calculated earlier by actually summing all of the
lost and surplus votes in the election. How might the advantage for Party A be
eliminated? There are two ways. The party either could have won six seats
instead of eight for the 55% vote share it actually received ((60% – 50%) – 2 x
(55% –50%) = 0), or it could have received 65% of the vote for the eight seats it
claimed ((80% – 50%) – 2 x (65% – 50%) = 0). As it is, Party A won two more
seats than it would have if the parties had wasted equal numbers of votes.
The efficiency gap’s second interesting property follows from these
calculations. Simply put, it is a measure of undeserved seat share: the proportion
of seats a party receives that it would not have received under a plan with equal
wasted votes. Above, for example, the efficiency gap for Party A is 20%, which
also happens to be Party A’s extra seat share relative to what it would have
received under a perfectly balanced plan (80% – 60% = 20%). Where it is
sensible to do so, this percentage can be converted to raw seats as well—in this
case, two extra seats out of ten. Thus, the efficiency gap is a tangible figure with
real-world meaning that laypeople can easily understand.
Third, the efficiency gap identifies a specific relationship between vote share
and seat share that corresponds to partisan fairness across a wide range of
outcomes. Specifically, each additional percentage point of vote share for a party
should result in an extra two percentage points of seat share. This relationship is
implied by the efficiency gap formula noted above. If the gap is zero, it can only
remain at this level if any shift in seat share is twice the size of any shift in vote
share. Also importantly, the relationship is not simply proportional, with each
additional percentage point of the vote netting an additional percentage point of
seats. Scholars have long recognized that SMD systems such as the American

103
See McGhee, supra note 12, at 79-80 (deriving this equation); see also, e.g., King & Browning, supra
note 20, at 1252 (also assuming “that there are only two parties . . . and that the legislature is composed of a set
of single-member, winner-take-all districts”).
104
The directionality of the measure is purely arbitrary. One might use the second party for all measures
instead, in which case negative values would imply an advantage for the first party.

Efficiency Gap

18

one tend to provide a “winner’s bonus” of surplus seats to the majority party,105
and the efficiency gap is consistent with this understanding. But the gap offers
what scholars to date have been unable to supply: a normative guide as to how
large this bonus should be.106 To produce partisan fairness, in the sense of equal
wasted votes for each party, the bonus should be a precisely twofold increase in
seat share for a given increase in vote share.107
Fourth, the efficiency gap can be calculated for any district plan, including in
states where one party enjoys a dominant electoral position. This feature makes it
possible to evaluate plans that to this point have been shielded from scrutiny
because one party’s advantage was so great. While some have argued that only
electoral systems where redistricting could conceivably affect control of the
legislature are of any practical interest,108 this position strikes us as overly
restrictive. For instance, a large number of legislatures require a supermajority to
pass key legislation. Indeed, in California, the only redistricting lawsuit of the
last cycle concerned supermajority control of the state senate in the context of a
two-thirds vote requirement for tax increases.109 Similarly, with respect to
congressional redistricting, it is not the state majority but the national one that
matters. If a party can extract extra seats that it does not deserve, those seats will
pay dividends in Washington, D.C. whether the state is competitive or not.
Finally, the efficiency gap does not require any counterfactual analysis. It can
be calculated using actual election results, without the need for any further
assumptions. As we describe in further detail below, we believe limited
counterfactual analysis can be helpful in determining the robustness of the
efficiency gap in the face of shifts in voter sentiment from election to election.110
Such analysis is especially important if an analyst thinks there is a high
likelihood that election outcomes will change substantially in the near future. But
these counterfactuals are not fundamental to the efficiency gap, and their size and
direction—and even the methods by which they are calculated—are left entirely
to the analyst’s discretion.
C. Comparison to Partisan Bias
Having defined the efficiency gap and explored its key properties, we are
now in a position to compare it to the measure of partisan symmetry—partisan
bias—that has dominated the literature111 and appeared on occasion in the case

105

See, e.g., Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 9.
See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 19, at 554 (describing “normative position that healthy
representative democracies have . . . high levels of electoral responsiveness” but not offering any target level for
responsiveness); Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 9 (referring to a “‘bonus’ of varying sizes”).
107
According to the efficiency gap equation, a purely proportional system disadvantages the majority
party, and by increasingly significant amounts as the party’s vote share climbs. If a party receives 60% of the
vote and 60% of the seats, for example, a plan would have an efficiency gap of 10% against the party.
108
See, e.g., Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 19.
109
See Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446 (Cal. 2012).
110
See infra Section III.B.
111
See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 6 (describing support for partisan bias as “virtually a consensus
position of the scholarly community”).
106
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law.112 (Partisan bias, again, refers to the divergence in the share of seats that
each party would win given the same share, typically 50%, of the statewide vote.
For example, if Republicans would win 52% of a state’s seats with 50% of the
state’s vote, then a district plan would have a pro-Republican bias of 2%.113) We
first demonstrate that the efficiency gap and partisan bias are different concepts,
at least in elections that are not tied. We then argue that the efficiency gap is the
superior metric because it more directly captures the essence of gerrymandering
and does not require the estimation of hypothetical election results.
To begin with, it is important to note that the efficiency gap and partisan bias
are deeply connected. In fact, the two measures are mathematically identical in
the special case where both parties receive exactly 50% of the vote. A party’s
vote margin is zero at this point, meaning that the efficiency gap is simply equal
to the party’s seat margin,114 while a party’s seat margin in a tied election is the
usual definition of partisan bias.115 More than a mathematical abstraction, this
identity implies a critical substantive point: a party can win more than half the
seats for half the votes only by exacerbating the efficiency gap in its favor. While
winning more seats is the outcome that partisan bias assesses, the manipulation
of wasted votes, gauged by the efficiency gap, is the activity that leads to this
outcome.
But the efficiency gap and partisan bias are not identical for all other election
results. This is because whenever an election does not produce a tie, the parties’
actual vote shares in each district must be shifted in order to calculate partisan
bias. Typically these vote shares are shifted so as to mimic a tied election, though
sometimes they are shifted to mimic the flipping of the parties’ statewide
performances.116 Whatever the rationale for the shifting, it causes partisan bias to
diverge from the efficiency gap, which is computed using the observed election
results. The parties’ seat shares in a counterfactual election are the key
determinant of partisan bias, while the parties’ wasted votes in the actual election
are the crucial input for the efficiency gap.
Figure 2 below uses election simulations to depict more fully the relationship
between the efficiency gap and partisan bias. We simulated 201 redistricting
plans of 25 seats each, with the parties’ statewide vote shares ranging from 25%
to 75%.117 We then calculated both the efficiency gap and partisan bias for each
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See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 464-68 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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See Gelman & King, supra note 19, at 543 (defining partisan bias); Grofman & King, supra note 11, at
6-13 (same); see also Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242, 1245 (1990) (calculating bias at 50%-50% point); Gary W. Cox
& Jonathan N. Katz, The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 812, 820 (1999) (same).
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simulated plan and determined the difference between them. If the measures
capture the same idea, the results should cluster around the horizontal zero line
for all vote shares. Instead, they are identical at the 50%-50% mark, very similar
(though not identical) for a few percentage points above and below this point,
and then highly divergent after that. In other words, the further an election falls
from the 50%-50% mark, the more uncorrelated the efficiency gap and partisan
bias become.

100% or below 0% were assigned to those two values, respectively. Each of these groups was symmetric in
expectation, but in practice many deviated from perfect symmetry due to random chance.
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FIGURE 2: EFFICIENCY GAP AND PARTISAN BIAS OF SIMULATED DISTRICT PLANS

In earlier work, one of us used empirical data from state legislative elections
to make much the same point. In competitive elections (those closer than 55%45%), partisan bias is an excellent predictor of a party’s seat share in a model that
also controls for the party’s vote share (coefficient = 0.73).118 But in
uncompetitive elections, the predictive power of partisan bias essentially
disappears (coefficient = -0.07).119 By comparison, the efficiency gap is a perfect
predictor of seat share in both competitive and uncompetitive elections
(coefficient = 1.0).120 The predictive power of partisan bias is thus a function of
how closely it converges on the efficiency gap (which it does fully at the 50%50% point).
If the efficiency gap and partisan bias are distinct concepts, why is the former
preferable to the latter as a measure of gerrymandering? The most basic answer
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relates to the meaning of gerrymandering, while the subtler reasons involve
issues with the calculation of partisan bias. Starting with the more fundamental
point, when observers assert that a district plan is a gerrymander, they usually
mean that it systematically benefits a party (and harms its opponent) in actual
elections.121 They do not mean that a plan would advantage a party in the
hypothetical event of a tied election, or if the parties’ vote shares flipped. In
common parlance, a plan is a gerrymander if it enables a party to convert its
votes into seats more efficiently than its adversary—even if this edge would
vanish under different electoral conditions. The efficiency gap reflects this
understanding, while partisan bias does not.
Turning next to the calculation of partisan bias, it is problematic, first,
because it relies on the uniform swing assumption: the premise that voteswitchers are present in equal numbers in each district.122 Even the more
advanced version of the metric introduced by Andrew Gelman and Gary King
“requires the statistical assumption of approximate uniform partisan swing,”123
that is, the supposition that “districts swing along with the statewide mean . . . but
only on average (due to the random error term[)].”124 It is only by shifting district
vote shares by (more or less) uniform amounts that the results of the crucial
hypothetical election can be estimated.
Unfortunately, the assumption of uniformity is often inaccurate, even in its
approximate version. The geographic distributions of the parties’ supporters are
highly heterogeneous,125 meaning that a given shift in the statewide vote is likely
to result in variable shifts at the district level. For instance, a statewide swing of
5% in the Republican direction might produce much larger pro-Republican
swings in districts full of independent voters who voted for a charismatic
Democrat in the previous election. But it might produce no pro-Republican swing
at all in polarized districts made up of staunch partisans whose political views are
largely set.126 Moreover, districts’ partisan swing is a partially endogenous
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See id. at 57 (“Some version of efficiency is typically the core concept of interest in the literature on
redistricting.”); see also, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 141 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The election
results obviously are relevant to a showing of the effects required to prove a political gerrymandering claim
under our view.”); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting test for
gerrymandering asking “whether the plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group”).
Notably, even proponents of partisan bias sometimes conceive of gerrymandering as “the degree to which an
electoral system unfairly favors one political party in the translation of statewide . . . votes into the partisan
division of the legislature.” Gelman & King, supra note 19, at 543.
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See supra notes 75-76, 93-94 and accompanying text.
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See Chen & Rodden, supra note 20, at 245-46 (finding very high level of spatial autocorrelation for
Democratic voting preferences in Florida); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1940-41 (same for array of
Census variables throughout country); see also Jackman, supra note 76, at 331 (“[W]hen we estimate bias . . .
we measure manipulation of the electoral system conditional on a spatial distribution of partisan support. As the
spatial distribution changes, so too will the bias . . . of the electoral system . . . .”).
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In the 2006 election for the U.S. House, for example, there was a mean pro-Democratic swing of 4.2%
in contested districts—with a standard deviation of 6.1%. The pro-Democratic swing ranged from a low of 19.1% to a high of 34.6%. See Christian R. Grose & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Iraq War, Partisanship, and
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phenomenon that can be influenced by the parties’ own campaign strategies. If
the parties focus their efforts in some districts but not in others (as they routinely
do), then uneven shifts at the district level are even more probable.127
The second problem with the calculation of partisan bias is that it cannot be
computed for highly uncompetitive systems (at least not sensibly). In such
systems, the vote share shifting that would have to be assumed to simulate a tied
election (let alone the flipping of the parties’ performances) is simply too
implausible to be taken seriously. As proponents of partisan bias concede, “the
methodology we propose is intended only for jurisdictions where the politics is
competitive enough that it is empirically feasible to develop reliable expectations
what each party would receive in seats if it won a given sized majority of the
votes.”128 It is precisely because enormous vote share shifts are unrealistic that, as
we noted above, partisan bias diverges from the efficiency gap so markedly in
uncompetitive elections.129
But even though partisan bias is inapplicable to uncompetitive systems,
gerrymandering is still possible—and ought to be measurable—in these settings.
A party can manipulate district lines so that its votes translate more efficiently
into seats whether it receives 50 percent or 70 percent of the statewide vote.
Notably, almost half of recent state legislative elections have been so
uncompetitive that partisan bias cannot be calculated for them reliably.130 A
metric that is so confined in its scope is of limited value.
One might respond that the question of majority control carries special
normative weight, and so what happens in uncompetitive systems, where
majority control is not at stake, is of little interest. But as we have argued, this
position is untenable when applied to U.S. House elections, where the relevant
majority is national rather than local. It is somewhat more valid when applied to
legislative elections, at least in states without supermajority requirements. But
supermajority requirements are pervasive, and so hardly irrelevant. Moreover,
changing the size of a majority party’s control is likely to have consequences for
policy even if majority control itself is not at issue. Even in today’s polarized

Candidate Attributes: Variations in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections, 32 LEGIS. STUDIES Q.
531, 533 (2007).
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See, e.g., Jenni Newton-Farrelly, From Blindfolds to Naked Emperors: Swing and Fair Electoral
Boundaries, SWINBURNE RES. BANK 3 (Sept. 27, 2010), http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/swin:19065 (describing how uniform swing assumption failed when “[t]he ALP ran the
most successful defensive marginal seats campaign seen in South Australia,” so that “the biggest swings
occurred in safe Labor seats and in fairly safe Liberal seats,” while marginal Labor seats barely swung at all);
see also Jackman, supra note 76, at 335 (finding that uniform swing assumption was wrong by average of 4% in
Australian elections in early 1980s).
While we use some uniform swing analysis to conduct our sensitivity tests, these tests are not fundamental
to the measurement of the efficiency gap. At any rate, one could easily conduct the sensitivity tests using
assumptions other than uniform swing.
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environment, cross-party coalitions are reasonably common at the state
legislative level, suggesting that the minority party might be able to pull policy
more in its direction as its numbers increase, even if it does not control the
agenda entirely.131
The final problem with the calculation of partisan bias is that it can
sometimes lead to quite counterintuitive results. These oddities tend to occur
when seats that actually are won by one party are assigned to the other party
when vote shares are shifted to simulate the hypothetical election. (In earlier
work, one of us has referred to this phenomenon as seats entering the
“counterfactual window.”132) Take, for example, the ten-district plan we used
earlier to show how the efficiency gap is computed.133 Since Party A received
55% of the statewide vote, its district-specific vote shares need to be reduced by
5% (and Party B’s increased by 5%) to determine the plan’s partisan bias. As
Figure 3 below shows, this shifting causes five districts (districts 4-8) that in fact
were won by Party A to be allocated to Party B in the hypothetical 50%-50%
election. The plan therefore has a partisan bias of 20% against Party A (since
Party B would win seven of the ten districts in a tied election), even though the
plan has an efficiency gap of 20% in favor of Party A (since Party A actually won
eight of the ten districts). This scenario sharpens the point with which we began
our critique of partisan bias: Because the metric assesses the results of a
counterfactual election, it sometimes may be unmoored entirely from the actual
election outcomes that are of primary concern.
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FIGURE 3: CALCULATION OF PARTISAN BIAS
District

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

Party A
Actual
Votes
70
70
70
54
54
54
54
54
35
35
550

Party B
Actual
Votes
30
30
30
46
46
46
46
46
65
65
450

Party A
Actual
Winner
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
8

Party B
Actual
Winner
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2

Party A
Shifted
Votes
65
65
65
49
49
49
49
49
30
30
500

Party B
Shifted
Votes
35
35
35
51
51
51
51
51
70
70
500

Party A
Shifted
Winner
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that there is no good reason to
use partisan bias as a measure of gerrymandering. It is conceptually flawed
because it focuses on hypothetical rather than actual election results. And as a
practical matter, it cannot sensibly be computed for the many electoral systems
that are uncompetitive, while it converges on the efficiency gap as systems
become more competitive. Partisan bias therefore is either an invalid metric (in
uncompetitive elections) or a redundant one (in competitive settings).
D. Limitations
Up to this point, we have introduced the efficiency gap and emphasized its
advantages over partisan bias. Next we consider the measure’s possible
limitations. There are three in particular: (1) the unexpected results that begin to
emerge when one party receives an extraordinarily high vote share; (2) the
metric’s instability over time; and (3) the measure’s sensitivity to the treatment of
uncontested seats. But none of these limitations is crippling. Sufficiently high
vote shares are very rare; the gap’s volatility can be addressed through sensitivity
testing; and sensible assumptions for uncontested seats tend to dampen rather
than exaggerate the gap.
As we have noted, the efficiency gap is useful for evaluating fairness across a
range of plans, even ones where one party significantly outperforms the other.
But for any system where one party truly dominates its opponent—specifically,
where one party receives more than 75% of the statewide vote—the efficiency
gap can produce results that at first glance seem strange. When one party receives
75% of the vote, a plan with a gap of zero will give that party 100% of the seats
(i.e., (100% – 50%) – 2 x (75% – 50%) = 0). And once a party holds all the seats,
any additional vote share above 75% will suggest a growing gap in favor of the
opposing party. This outcome is technically correct: when a party already holds
all the seats, additional votes are wasted since they cannot contribute to more

Party B
Shifted
Winner
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
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victories. Nonetheless, it fails to capture the idea of fairness at stake in
redistricting, since the majority party in this situation could hardly be said to
suffer a disadvantage.
That said, this scenario is easily identified in any redistricting analysis. All an
analyst must do is flag elections in which a party received at least 75% of the
statewide vote and 100% of the seats. More to the point, results this lopsided are
extremely rare. No party has received more than 75% of the aggregate vote in
state legislative elections since 1982, and there are only 18 such cases out of 800
in congressional elections (all of them either in the South or in states with fewer
than four House districts).134 And even in these cases, the majority party did not
always win every single seat, meaning that the actual universe of potentially odd
outcomes is smaller still. Accordingly, this is not a problem that is especially
relevant to real-life redistricting.
The efficiency gap’s potentially more important limitation is instability.
While in theory the efficiency gap could be constant over time—it remains fixed
so long as seat shares and vote shares move together in the 2-to-1 ratio specified
by the formula—as a practical matter it tends to fluctuate. In fact, in the original
exposition of the measure, one of us showed that most redistricting plans are
volatile enough that their precise consequences cannot be forecast with great
accuracy. Specifically, a plan’s efficiency gap in one election is a relatively weak
predictor of its gap in the next election (coefficient = 0.23) in a model that also
includes a variety of other factors.135 Many partisan gerrymanders therefore are
not solid enough to avoid coming undone in the face of changing political winds.
However, this instability is not so much a weakness of the measure as it is a
property of the elections themselves. The parties’ vote shares vary much more
over the life of a district plan than is commonly realized: by up to 5.5% in either
direction for most state house plans over a typical decade, and by up to 7.5% for
most congressional plans.136 It is relatively unsurprising that seat shares do not
change in tandem pursuant to the 2-to-1 ratio, and that the efficiency gap thus
swings from election to election. By comparison, partisan bias is fairly stable.
But this relative stability is an artifact of the measure itself, stemming from the
fact that it shifts all actual election results to the point of the hypothetical
election. This shifting negates all uniform swings that may have occurred, and
even negates any non-uniform swings that fail to move any districts into the
counterfactual window.137
Moreover, to say that many gerrymanders come undone is not to say that
they all evaporate. As we illustrate in the next Part, some district plans in
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(1984).
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previous cycles indeed featured large and durable efficiency gaps over multiple
elections. They persisted in benefiting a particular party, year in and year out. As
for the plans currently in effect, sensitivity testing can determine their stability in
the face of a wide range of future electoral shifts. So long as certain plans would
remain unbalanced over an array of potential outcomes—as several indeed
would, per the next Part’s calculations—the case for judicial intervention is
unaffected. In fact, it is strengthened, because then courts can be more confident
that the plans’ distortion is a lasting rather than an ephemeral phenomenon.
Finally, the efficiency gap can be sensitive to the treatment of uncontested
seats. These seats pose a tricky problem for any measure of gerrymandering
(including partisan bias). Since gerrymanders redistribute voters in order to pack
and crack the opposition, determining the degree of packing and cracking
requires knowing how many people in each district support each party. This
support need not be unconditional: it can change over time in response to the
candidates, the parties’ platforms, the parties’ relative performances in office,
and so forth. Indeed, this variation is the essence of the sensitivity testing we
describe in greater detail below. But the notion of support hinges on freedom of
choice: voters must be able, in principle, to select more than one option. Absent
such a choice, we simply do not obtain any information about voters’
preferences.
Uncontested races by definition offer no choice at all: they require voters to
support one party, and deny them the opportunity to reveal their true sympathies.
Indeed, the one thing we can say with virtual certainty about an uncontested race
is that its outcome would have been different had it been contested. The winner
might have been the same, but the share of the vote for the winner almost
certainly would have been lower. For example, in 95% of state legislative
districts with uncontested Democrats, Republicans managed at least 17% of the
vote when the same district was contested in other elections. Likewise, in 95% of
cases with uncontested Republicans, Democrats garnered at least 25% of the vote
when they ran a candidate for the seat. In most of these cases, the minority
party’s average vote share was even higher than these numbers would suggest.
For this reason, scholars often try to assign vote shares to uncontested races
that reflect how voters might have cast their ballots if they had been given a
choice. There are several ways this assignment can be done. The most defensible
is to use variables that have been shown in the past to predict vote share, and then
to impute values for uncontested races based on these variables. One might also
examine how uncontested districts have turned out in previous years when those
same seats were contested. Or one might simply assume that the opposing party
would have received a certain vote share (e.g., 25%) had it run a candidate in an
uncontested district. Clearly, these imputation approaches can be more or less
sophisticated, and can bring varying amounts of information to bear on the
problem.
For our analysis here we followed two different imputation strategies. For
congressional races, we obtained presidential vote share data at the district level,
and then ran regressions of vote choice in contested seats on incumbency status
and district presidential vote separately for each election year. From this
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information, we imputed values for uncontested seats. For uncontested
Democrats, this procedure resulted in a mean Democratic vote share of 70%,
with 90% of values falling between 56% and 87%. For uncontested Republicans,
it produced a mean Democratic vote share of 32%, with 90% of values falling
between 22% and 43%.
Unfortunately, we did not have presidential vote share data by state house
district for all the years in our analysis, so we were forced to take a different
imputation approach for these chambers. For all contested state house races, we
ran a multilevel model with a fixed effect for incumbency and random effects for
years, states, and districts. For uncontested districts that had been contested at
some point in their lifespan, this equation assigned a single value by effectively
borrowing information from other districts in the same state and election year,
and from the same district at other points in time. For uncontested districts that
were never contested, we took a random draw from the distribution of district
random effects and used it for prediction. Despite the differences in chamber and
methodology, the results were remarkably similar to those for the House. For
uncontested Democrats, we calculated a mean Democratic vote share of 66%,
with 90% of values falling between 52% and 83%. For uncontested Republicans,
we calculated a mean Democratic vote share of 36%, with 90% of values falling
between 25% and 48%.
Going forward, we encourage other scholars to explore a range of imputation
techniques to ensure that the direction of a gerrymander (if not its size) is robust
to any particular strategy. But this catholic philosophy has its limits. We strongly
discourage analysts from either dropping uncontested races from the computation
or treating them as if they produced unanimous support for a party. The former
approach eliminates important information about a plan, while the latter assumes
that coerced votes accurately reflect political support. Neither correctly
represents how the gerrymandering party itself would view its plan.
III. GERRYMANDERING OVER TIME AND SPACE
Now that we have introduced the efficiency gap, we turn to what for many
readers will be the most important question addressed by this Article: What gaps
have district plans actually exhibited over the years and across the states? We
begin this Part by presenting some summary statistics about the gaps of
congressional and state house plans from 1972 to 2012. The gaps’ distributions
over this period both had medians close to zero and were roughly symmetric in
shape. Thus, as a historical matter, neither party enjoyed a systematic advantage
over its opponent. In recent years, however, there has been a startling rise in the
level of the efficiency gap. In the 2012 election, in particular, the average
absolute gap of both congressional and state house plans spiked to unprecedented
heights.
We next report our findings about all of the individual district plans in our
database. For each prior plan, we show both its average gap over its existence
and the gap’s full range of values during this period. For each current plan, we
show its gap in the 2012 election as well as the spectrum of values the gap could
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take given plausible shifts in voter sentiment. One important conclusion is that
most plans are reasonably fair and reasonably likely to favor different parties at
different points during their lifespans. But another key point is that multiple
current plans are exceptions to this general rule. More of today’s plans feature
large efficiency gaps that are unlikely to dissipate than ever before in modern
history.
Lastly, we single out the plans, both past and present, that have given rise to
partisan gerrymandering litigation. Interestingly, the plans that plaintiffs have
targeted have not featured especially large efficiency gaps. This poor record
suggests that plaintiffs often have lacked accurate estimates of plans’ partisan
effects. It also hints that courts may have acted prudently in rejecting many
gerrymandering challenges. But this past prudence does not mean that courts
should continue to rebuff gerrymandering suits. The efficiency gap provides
exactly what litigants and courts have long been missing: a reliable assessment of
plans’ partisan implications.
A. Summary Statistics
We used congressional and state house election results from 1972 to 2012 to
carry out our efficiency gap calculations.138 We only considered congressional
plans for states that had at least eight districts at some point during this period,
because redistricting in smaller states has only a minor influence on the national
balance of power. We also only considered single-member state house districts,
because the efficiency gap is more difficult to compute for multimember
districts.139 Furthermore, we report the efficiency gap in seats for congressional
plans and in seat shares for state house plans. What matters in congressional
plans is their impact on the total number of seats held by each party at the
national level.140 Conversely, state houses are self-contained bodies of varying
sizes, for which seat shares reveal the scale of parties’ advantages and enable
temporal and spatial comparability.

138
Congressional election results are available at Election Information: Election Statistics, OFFICE OF THE
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Figure 4 below shows the distributions of the efficiency gap for
congressional and state house plans from the 1970s—the first full cycle of the
modern one-person, one-vote era—to the present. Each plan in each election year
is represented in the distributions; we do not average each cycle’s plans here. The
most obvious point about the curves is that their medians both are close to zero
and their shapes both are approximately symmetric.141 Both curves are tilted
slightly in a pro-Republican direction, as reflected in their longer Republican tails
and their average efficiency gaps of -0.20 seats for Congress and -0.42% for state
houses (where negative values are pro-Republican). But this imbalance is
relatively trivial. For the most part, the efficiency gap hovers around zero, and
there are plans that clearly favor both parties.
Our results diverge from recent findings by other scholars that most district
plans are biased in a pro-Republican direction.142 We attribute the divergence to
several factors. First, the other scholars used partisan bias as their measure of
gerrymandering, not the efficiency gap.143 As we explained earlier, partisan bias
scores become increasingly uncorrelated with efficiency gap scores as elections
grow less competitive.144 Second, the other scholars calculated partisan bias using
presidential election results rather than legislative election results.145 If certain
voters consistently support Republicans at the presidential level and Democrats at
the legislative level, then presidential data may produce more pro-Republican
estimates than legislative data.146 And third, the other scholars only studied
elections in the early 2000s, a period in which we also find a pro-Republican
skew.147 Our conclusion that plans over the entire modern era have been
reasonably balanced is consistent with the work of political scientists who have
examined longer timespans.148
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preliminary hypothesis is that both approaches produce similar results for modern elections, in which voters are
well sorted by ideology, and more divergent results for past elections, in which the parties were not as
ideologically coherent. We hope that future research will test this hypothesis.
147
See id. at 261, 264; see also infra figs. 5-6 (showing change in efficiency gap over time).
148
See, e.g., COX & KATZ, supra note 19, at 59 (showing pro-Republican bias in 1950s at congressional
level followed by close to zero bias in 1960s); Gelman & King, supra note 124, at 540 (same, and also showing
pro-Democratic bias in 1970s and 1980s); Gelman & King, supra note 19, at 546 (showing wide range of bias
values for state legislative plans in 1970s and 1980s); King & Browning, supra note 20, at 1261-62.
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FIGURE 4: EFFICIENCY GAP DISTRIBUTIONS, 1972-2012

Next, Figures 5 and 6 below chart the average net efficiency gap and the
average absolute efficiency gap over time.149 The average net gap is the mean of
all plans’ actual gaps in a given year, while the average absolute gap is the mean
of the absolute values of all plans’ gaps. The average net gap indicates the overall
partisan direction of gerrymandering, while the average absolute gap reveals its
overall magnitude. The average net gap plots confirm the account, hinted at
above, of plans increasingly favoring Republicans over time. At the
congressional level, plans in the 1970s were roughly balanced in aggregate (0.10
seats), plans in the 1980s slightly benefited Democrats (0.27 seats), plans in the
1990s slightly benefited Republicans (-0.27 seats), plans in the 2000s

149
Since we do not have exactly the same states for every year in our database of state legislative
elections, we wanted to make sure that the trends we observe are not a product of this data issue. We therefore
ran an OLS regression with fixed effects for years and states. The year fixed effects then represent the change
over time independent of fixed state characteristics. We averaged the actual efficiency gaps for 1972, and then
added the year fixed effects to that value to generate the rest of the time series. This process produces results
very similar to simple averaging.
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substantially benefited Republicans (-0.72 seats), and plans in 2012 even more
dramatically benefited Republicans (-1.21 seats).150 At the state house level,
similarly, the trend has been from a modest edge for Democrats in the 1970s
(1.32%) and 1980s (1.27%), to ever larger advantages for Republicans in the
1990s (-1.17%), 2000s (-2.01%), and 2012 (-3.48%).151
The story for the average absolute gap is somewhat different. At both the
congressional and state house levels, it remained roughly constant between 1972
and 2010 (though with perhaps a slight upward tilt, especially from the 1980s
onward). But it then spiked in the 2012 election to the highest peaks recorded in
the modern era—1.58 seats at the congressional level, compared to an average of
1.02 seats in the four previous cycles, and 6.53% at the state house level,
compared to an average of 4.99% in the four prior decades. The increase in the
magnitude of gerrymandering thus is a very recent phenomenon, while the
movement in the Republican direction dates back somewhat further.
These findings indicate that the growing Republican advantage in the 1990s
and 2000s was due not to more severe gerrymandering but rather to some other
factor: perhaps control over redistricting in more states, or larger numbers of
Republican incumbents eking out narrow wins, or favorable trends in voters’
residential patterns. If plans in this period had been gerrymandered more
aggressively than their predecessors, then their average absolute gap would have
increased, not held steady. The findings also suggest that the striking outcomes of
the 2012 election are due, at least in part, to more extreme gerrymandering. In
2012, unlike in previous years, the average absolute gap spiked just as the
average net gap surged in a pro-Republican direction.152

150
This is quite similar to the pattern that one of us found in a historical analysis of partisan bias. See John
Sides & Eric McGhee, Redistricting Didn’t Win Republicans the House, WASH. POST WONKBLOG, Feb. 17,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/17/redistricting-didnt-win-republicans-thehouse/ (showing that Democrats benefited at congressional level in 1970s and 1980s, Republicans benefited
slightly in 1990s, and Republicans benefited significantly in 2000s and 2012); see also Tony L. Hill, Electoral
Bias and the Partisan Impact of Independent Redistricting Bodies: An Analysis Incorporating the Brookes
Method 19 (Apr. 3-6, 2008) (same).
151
The pro-Democratic spike in the average net gap in 2010 is also notable. It is likely explained by a
number of Democratic incumbents barely hanging on to their seats in a very pro-Republican year.
152
For a similar argument, see Anthony J. McGann et al., Revenge of the Anti-Federalists: Constitutional
Implications of Redistricting 28-29, 42-50 (2014) (attributing rise in pro-Republican partisan bias in 2012 to
more severe gerrymandering in wake of Vieth).
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FIGURE 5: AVERAGE NET AND ABSOLUTE EFFICIENCY GAPS FOR
CONGRESSIONAL PLANS, 1972-2012
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FIGURE 6: AVERAGE NET AND ABSOLUTE EFFICIENCY GAPS FOR STATE HOUSE
PLANS, 1972-2012

B. Individual Plans
We turn next from summary statistics about the efficiency gap to individual
district plans. This plan-level information, of course, is precisely what litigants
and courts would need to assess maps’ partisan fairness. Figures 7 and 8 below,
then, display the gaps of congressional and state house plans used in the five
cycles of the modern redistricting era. As before, we present the gaps in terms of
seats for Congress and seat shares for state houses. When multiple plans were
employed by a state in a given cycle, we depict each of them separately.
Furthermore, we are interested in capturing the extent to which each plan’s gap
changed (or would change) over its lifetime in order to gauge the robustness of
the plan’s partisan skew. Gerrymanders, we reiterate, can often come undone in
shifting political circumstances.
To this end, for each plan in earlier cycles, we show its average efficiency
gap as well as the full range of values taken by the gap over the plan’s existence.
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This information reveals the plan’s partisan implications as they in fact unfolded.
For each plan currently in effect, the gap’s range cannot be calculated directly—
the necessary elections simply have not occurred. Instead, to explore the
spectrum of possible outcomes, we shift the observed 2012 vote share up and
down by a uniform amount, and then record how the gap changes as a result.
When choosing the scale and direction of this shifting, we wanted to remain as
agnostic as possible about the future electoral path of each state. We thus used
the variation that actually occurred in past elections to anchor our simulation, and
selected a level of shifting that covered four out of every five prior outcomes.153
Since each plan typically spans five elections, this approach ensures that any plan
that does not cross the zero axis in the simulation is unlikely to do so in a given
cycle. The shifts we derived from the historical data also are quite large: 7.5% in
either direction for Congress and 5.5% in either direction for state houses.
Accordingly, we are confident that we have devised a stringent test of
gerrymanders’ robustness to varying electoral conditions.
Our efficiency gap computations, combined with our sensitivity testing, lead
to several important conclusions. First, many plans either are balanced to begin
with or can unravel in changing political circumstances. Out of the 120
congressional plans we examined, 80 had mean efficiency gaps of less than one
seat, and 59 crossed the zero axis at some point during their lifespans. Likewise,
of the 167 state house plans in our study, 87 had mean gaps of below 4%, and 76
favored different parties at different points in the cycle.154 It thus is only the
occasional plan that has a large or durable efficiency gap. Severe and persistent
gerrymandering is the historical exception rather than the rule.
Second, while a Republican advantage is more common, there are numerous
examples of plans that strongly favor Democrats as well. Political scientists often
argue that America’s underlying political geography benefits Republicans,
because Democratic supporters are concentrated in urban centers where they are
likely to waste their votes in overwhelmingly safe districts.155 As we discuss
below, the spatial allocation of voters may be legally relevant as a justification
for plans whose efficiency gaps exceed the key thresholds.156 Nevertheless, there
are multiple cases of plans that are biased robustly in favor of Democrats,
including the Texas congressional plans in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the first

153
Specifically, we started with the aggregate vote share in each state in the first year each plan was used
(usually 1972, 1982, 1992, or 2002). We then calculated the deviations from this year’s outcome that occurred
throughout the remainder of the redistricting cycle. These deviations gave us a sense of the range of outcomes
that may ultimately transpire for the plans currently in effect. We then chose vote share shifts that covered the
tenth through the ninetieth percentiles of this variable’s distribution. For congressional plans, this approach
produced a range of roughly 7.5% in either direction, while for state house plans it produced a range of roughly
5.5% in either direction.
154
We use these levels here because they are half of the thresholds that we later recommend in our
discussion of presumptively valid and invalid plans. See infra Section IV.A. In addition, a substantial portion of
the plans that do not cross the zero axis were in effect for only an election or two. Had they been used for the
entire decade, they may well have crossed the axis too.
155
See, e.g., Chen & Rodden, supra note 20.
156
See infra Section IV.B.
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California congressional plan in the 1980s,157 the current Rhode Island state
house plan, and several southern state house plans in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s. Pronounced Republican edges may be more prevalent, but they do not
exhaust the universe of unbalanced plans.
Third, plans’ efficiency gaps have become both larger and more proRepublican over time. This point already was made by the time series charts we
presented earlier, but it is confirmed by the plan-level data. At the congressional
level, there were two plans in the 1970s with average gaps of more than two seats
(one pro-Democratic and one pro-Republican), four plans in the 1980s (three proDemocratic), four plans in the 1990s (two pro-Republican), four plans in the
2000s (three pro-Republican), and seven plans in 2012 (all pro-Republican).
Similarly, at the state house level, there were six plans in the 1970s with an
average gap of greater than 8% (four pro-Democratic), seven plans in the 1980s
(five pro-Democratic), seven plans in the 1990s (four pro-Republican), three
plans in the 2000s (two pro-Republican), and thirteen plans in 2012 (twelve proRepublican).158 Whether one considers aggregated or disaggregated data, it thus
is clear that the scale and skew of today’s gerrymandering are unprecedented in
modern history.
C. Gerrymandering Litigation
The final piece of information conveyed by Figures 7 and 8 is whether a plan
gave rise to partisan gerrymandering litigation. If it did, it is colored in red in the
charts. Because the courts did not recognize this cause of action until the 1980s,
we do not count gerrymandering-like claims that were brought in the 1970s. By
our count, four of the plans in our study were challenged on this basis in the
1980s, eight in the 1990s, eleven in the 2000s, and eight in the 2010s (so far).159
Interestingly, the Court’s decisions in Vieth and LULAC seem to have had only a
minor dampening effect on plaintiffs’ willingness to file gerrymandering suits.
Plaintiffs may not have noticed the Court’s signals about the sorts of theories
they should assert,160 but they have capitalized on the Court’s refusal to rule out
gerrymandering claims entirely.
The most important point about the litigated plans is that they are not the
ones that have exhibited the largest or most durable efficiency gaps. In the
current cycle, for instance, none of the eight challenged plans satisfies the
definition we set forth below of a presumptive gerrymander (i.e., a gap of more
than two seats for Congress or eight percent for state houses that is expected to
endure for the entire cycle).161 Of the sixteen plans that do satisfy our definition,

157
California’s infamous “Burton gerrymander” actually exhibits the largest efficiency gap of any
congressional plan in our database. Cf. ANDREW J. TAYLOR, ELEPHANT’S EDGE: THE REPUBLICANS AS A
RULING PARTY 40 (2005) (discussing this plan at length).
158
These are the same thresholds we use later in our discussion of the appropriate legal test for partisan
gerrymandering. See infra Section IV.A.
159
In the interest of brevity, we do not cite all of these cases here. The citations are available upon request.
160
See supra Section I.C.
161
See infra Section IV.A.
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none was contested in court on this basis. The story is the same in earlier cycles.
Of the twenty-three prior plans that were alleged to be unlawful gerrymanders,
only five would have met our standard: Florida’s congressional and state house
plans in the 2000s, Texas’s congressional plans in the 1990s and 2000s, and
California’s congressional plan in the 1980s. The numerous other plans that
would have met our standard escaped any judicial scrutiny of their partisan
implications.
To be fair, the litigated plans have not been entirely random, at least at the
congressional level. The average litigated House plan has had a mean absolute
efficiency gap of 1.47 seats, compared to 0.98 for unlitigated plans. Moreover,
many of the plans that were not challenged on gerrymandering grounds were
challenged on other bases, often with partisanship as the unspoken impetus for
the litigation. For example, of the sixteen current plans that satisfy our definition
of a presumptive gerrymander, eleven were attacked on one-person, one-vote,
Voting Rights Act, racial gerrymandering, or state law grounds.162
Putting aside these caveats, why have plaintiffs been so inaccurate in the
plans they have targeted? One likely answer is that they have lacked reliable
information about the magnitude and durability of gerrymandering. The most
common existing measure of gerrymandering, partisan bias, very rarely has been
cited in litigation.163 And, to our knowledge, there has not been any previous
effort to determine the stability of gerrymandering through sensitivity testing.
Plaintiffs thus have not had the necessary tools to identify especially egregious
plans. Another potential answer is that, given the extremely low odds of
prevailing on a gerrymandering claim, there simply may be no rhyme or reason
to when one is included in a suit. The decision to assert such a claim may be
essentially arbitrary, in which case one would not expect litigated plans to exhibit
unusually large efficiency gaps.
Whatever the reason may be for plaintiffs’ past inaccuracy, we think it
actually has positive implications for judicial intervention in the future. If past
plaintiffs challenged plans almost at random, then courts acted wisely in rejecting
these suits. But if future plaintiffs begin attacking only the worst gerrymanders—
the ones with the largest and most durable efficiency gaps—then courts’ prior
passivity would be no justification for continued inaction. Then plaintiffs would
be coming to courts not with unsubstantiated allegations but rather with hard data
about plans’ gaps relative to those of other states. The resulting cases would bear
little resemblance to their antecedents in earlier cycles.

162
See Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php; cf.
Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 630-31 (2002) (noting that
in “the absence of any real constitutional vigilance over partisan gerrymandering,” “litigants must squeeze all
claims of improper manipulation of redistricting into [other categories]”).
163
A Westlaw search turns up only three gerrymandering decisions that have referred to partisan bias. See
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006); Quilter v. Vonovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 733-34 (N.D. Ohio),
rev’d, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 79-80 (N.M. 2012).
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FIGURE 7: EFFICIENCY GAPS FOR CONGRESSIONAL PLANS BY STATE, 1972-2012
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FIGURE 8: EFFICIENCY GAPS FOR STATE HOUSE PLANS BY STATE, 1972-2012
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IV. A POTENTIAL TEST
The goal of this Article is not only to introduce the efficiency gap to a legal
audience and to summarize its levels over time and space. It is also to show how
the efficiency gap could be made the centerpiece of a doctrinal test for partisan
gerrymandering. It is to show, in other words, how an approach based on the
efficiency gap could exploit the opportunity created by the Court in LULAC
while addressing the concerns raised about symmetry by Justice Kennedy.
In this Part, then, we explain how we envision that the efficiency gap would
operate as doctrine. First, courts would need to choose a threshold above which
district plans would be presumptively unlawful and below which they would be
presumptively valid. Our suggestion is that the bar be set at two seats for
congressional plans and eight percent for state house plans—with the additional
caveat that the plans not be expected, based on sensitivity testing, ever to have an
efficiency gap of zero over their lifetimes.164 Second, states whose plans have
efficiency gaps above these thresholds would have the chance to show that the
gaps either resulted from the consistent application of legitimate policies, or were
inevitable due to the states’ underlying political geography. If it is actually the
case that plans with gaps below the thresholds could not be drawn while still
achieving the states’ policies, or could not be drawn at all, then there would be no
constitutional violation.
Finally, we revisit the criticisms leveled at partisan symmetry by Justice
Kennedy in LULAC, and argue that they are unfounded with respect to the
efficiency gap. The efficiency gap does not require any assumptions about where
potential vote-switchers might live, nor does it involve speculation about the
results of specific hypothetical elections. Moreover, the empirical data we have
presented enables reasonable thresholds to be selected, which then would be used
not alone, but rather along with states’ redistricting policies and political
geography, to answer the ultimate constitutional question.
A. Setting the Threshold
The issue that most bedeviled the Vieth Court was how to distinguish
between some partisan unfairness, which presumably is lawful, and too much
unfairness, which is not. The Court stressed that “[t]he central problem is
determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far,” adding that the
“unanswerable question” is “[h]ow much political motivation and effect is too
much.”165 In the Court’s view, none of the verbal formulations offered by the
parties or the dissenting Justices in the case could resolve this concern. Valid
plans could not be told apart from invalid ones based on qualitative standards
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Since we have not gathered data on state senate plans, we do not attempt to set a threshold for them
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Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296-97 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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such as “predominant intent,” “extremity of unfairness,” or “unjustified
entrenchment.”166
The Vieth Court may well be right that, in the exceedingly complex area of
redistricting, no qualitative test can distinguish between lawful and unlawful
plans with sufficient consistency. But a qualitative test is not the only option.
Another possibility is a quantitative approach that relies on a calculable metric of
gerrymandering. Notably, a quantitative approach is how the Court answered
Justice Harlan’s charge in Reynolds v. Sims that “cases of this type”—that is,
cases involving claims of unequal district population—“are not amenable to the
development of judicial standards.”167 Over a series of decisions, the Court
decided that any deviations from perfect population equality in congressional
plans must be justified by legitimate policies that necessitate the inequality.168
The Court also concluded that population deviations above ten percent in state
legislative plans must be justified in the same manner.169 But deviations below
ten percent in state plans are presumptively valid unless they result from efforts
to disadvantage a political or racial group.170
The efficiency gap makes possible the same doctrinal move in the
gerrymandering context that population deviation enabled in the reapportionment
context. Just as the Court was able to avoid hazy verbal formulations by adopting
precise deviation thresholds, so too could it reply to Vieth’s “unanswerable
question” by specifying an efficiency gap level above which plans would be
presumptively unlawful and below which they would be presumptively
legitimate.171 This approach would neatly slice Vieth’s Gordian knot, informing
lower courts and political actors, in clear quantitative terms, exactly “[h]ow much
political . . . effect is too much.”172
How much political effect, then, is too much? One option is to follow the
Court’s lead in the congressional reapportionment cases and to set an efficiency
gap of zero as the threshold. In this case, any district plan that did not treat the
parties identically in terms of wasted votes would be presumptively invalid. Any
such plan would be upheld only if its efficiency gap either was the necessary
result of a legitimate state policy, or was unavoidable given the geographic
distribution of the parties’ supporters. The overarching judicial goal, as in the
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See id. at 284, 295, 299.
377 U.S. 533, 621 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (claiming that there are no “legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to
draw upon for making judicial judgments” in reapportionment cases).
168
See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983) (“First, the court must consider whether the
population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether . . . . [Next,] the State
must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some
legitimate goal.”); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 536-37 (1969).
169
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161-62 (1993); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43
(1983) (“Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in
population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State.”
(internal citations omitted)); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977).
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See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004).
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Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion).
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Id. at 297.
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congressional reapportionment cases, would be to make the efficiency gap “as
nearly as is practicable” equal to zero.173
For several reasons, we do not recommend a zero threshold. First, it would
be incompatible with the Court’s repeated statements in Vieth that some partisan
unfairness indeed is permissible. The Court emphasized in its opinion that
“segregat[ing voters] by political affiliation is (so long as one doesn’t go too far)
lawful and hence ordinary.”174 Right or wrong, this sentiment cannot be
reconciled with a mandate that plans’ efficiency gaps be reduced to zero. Second,
a zero threshold would mean that almost every current plan is presumptively
unconstitutional—and that almost every plan ever enacted also likely should have
been struck down. Even the most zealous reformer should hesitate before
advocating standards with such disruptive consequences. Lastly, as we illustrated
above with empirical evidence, plans’ efficiency gaps vary markedly from
election to election.175 It thus is futile to insist on a gap of zero at any particular
moment, because in all likelihood the gap will have assumed a non-zero value by
the time of the next election.
Instead of a zero threshold, we recommend setting the bar at two seats for
congressional plans and eight percent for state house plans, with the further
proviso that sensitivity testing show that the efficiency gaps are unlikely to hit
zero over the plans’ lifetimes.176 Our rationale for using different metrics for
congressional and for state house plans (seats and seat shares, respectively) is
identical to why we presented the data differently in the previous Part.177 States’
congressional delegations combine to form a single legislative body, the U.S.
House of Representatives, in which the parties seek to win as many seats as
possible. Since aggregate House seats are the parties’ main objective, it follows
that the efficiency gap should be measured in seats rather than in percentage
points. An eight-point gap in California simply is not commensurate, legally or
politically, to an eight-point gap in Connecticut. But this logic flips for state
house plans. Each state house is a self-contained entity, elected entirely by the
state’s own voters. State houses also vary dramatically in size, from as few as 40
members (in Alaska) to as many as 400 (in New Hampshire). For discrete bodies
of such divergent sizes, seat shares, not raw seats, are the appropriate unit of
measurement.
We selected the two-seat threshold for congressional plans by examining
their actual efficiency gaps over the last five redistricting cycles (i.e., the entire
period following the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s). A gap of two or
more seats placed a plan in the worst 10% of all plans in this era, roughly 1.5
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See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730; Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529-30; cf. Grofman & King, supra note 11, at
21 (suggesting minimization of partisan bias as potential test for gerrymandering).
174
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting standard based on “minor departures from some supposed norm”).
175
See supra Section III.B.
176
Cf. Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 22 (offering as another judicial option a test employing a
partisan bias threshold).
177
Cf. id. at 21-22 (noting possibility of setting partisan bias threshold in terms of seats rather than
percentage points).
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standard deviations from the mean. In each of the decades we analyzed, only a
handful of plans had average gaps of this magnitude. Illinois and Texas did so in
the 1970s; California (the first plan), New York, and Texas (both plans) in the
1980s; California, New York, and Texas (both plans) in the 1990s; and
California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas (the first plan) in the 2000s. (It is too
soon, of course, to compute average gaps for the 2010s.) A two-seat gap
therefore indicates that a district plan is gerrymandered to an unusual extent and
that the gerrymandering has an unusually large impact on the makeup of the
House as a whole. Such a gap does not quite make a plan an outlier in the overall
distribution, but it does show that the plan is far from the historical norm.
Analogously, we chose the eight-point threshold for state house plans on the
basis of their efficiency gaps over the last five decades. A gap of at least eight
points placed a plan in the worst 13% of all plans in this period, also about 1.5
standard deviations from the mean. Again, only a small minority of plans had
average gaps of this size in each decade we studied. Alabama, Georgia, Idaho,
New York, South Carolina, and Texas did so in the 1970s; Alabama (both plans),
Georgia, Idaho (both plans), Mississippi, and South Carolina in the 1980s;
Alabama, Idaho, Kentucky (first plan), Illinois, Nevada, Ohio (second plan), and
Wyoming in the 1990s; and Florida, Ohio, and Vermont in the 2000s. An eightpoint gap for a state house plan, like a two-seat gap for a congressional plan, thus
is indicative of uncommonly severe gerrymandering.178
A word is in order too about the sensitivity testing we recommend
incorporating into the thresholds. We recommend the testing because, as we have
stressed, a plan’s efficiency gap may change substantially from one election to
the next. It makes little sense to say that a plan is a presumptively unlawful
gerrymander in one election, if in the next its efficiency gap could switch to favor
the opposing party. To take into account this volatility, we propose treating a
plan as presumptively invalid only if its gap exceeds the threshold we have
identified and the gap is unlikely to hit zero over the plan’s lifetime. To
determine the odds of the gap hitting zero, we suggest shifting the actual election
results by percentages derived from historical data—up to 7.5% in each direction
for congressional plans and up to 5.5% for state house plans—and then
calculating the gap for each vote share shift.179 Only if the gap remains on the
same side of the zero axis in all of these calculations should the presumption of
unconstitutionality apply.

178
We also considered, but ultimately deciding against, recommending a ten-point threshold for state
house plans. The rationale for a ten-point threshold is that it would mirror the ten-point population deviation
that the Court presumptively permits in the reapportionment context. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 468
n.9 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It would, of course, be an eminently
manageable standard for the Court to conclude that deviations of over 10% from symmetry create a prima facie
case of an unconstitutional gerrymander, just as population deviations among districts of more than 10% create
such a prima facie case.”). But, in our view, this coincidental convergence is not a good enough reason to make
the state house threshold substantially laxer than the congressional threshold. An efficiency gap of at least ten
points, notably, placed a state house plan in the worst 5% of prior plans, roughly 3.0 standard deviations from
the mean.
179
See supra Section III.B (discussing our sensitivity testing in more detail).
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What would this approach mean for the plans currently in force across the
country?180 At the congressional level, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia had efficiency gaps of at least two seats in the
2012 election (all in the Republicans’ favor). But the sensitivity testing shows
that plausible shifts in voter sentiment could result in the Michigan, North
Carolina, and Texas plans advantaging Democrats instead. Thus only the Florida,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia plans would be presumptively unlawful. At the
state house level, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
had efficiency gaps of at least eight points in the 2012 election (most but not all
in the Republicans’ favor). Of these plans, all but Florida are unlikely to cross the
zero axis during the rest of the decade, and so would be presumptively invalid
under our proposed test.181
A final point about these thresholds is that they need not be adopted by
courts at quite this level of specificity, at least not at once. Lacking experience
with the efficiency gap, courts may be reluctant in early cases to set particular
levels above which plans are presumptively unlawful and below which they are
presumptively legitimate. Instead, courts may prefer to strike down plans with
extremely high efficiency gaps and to uphold plans with very low gaps, while
leaving it ambiguous where exactly the transition from presumptive validity to
invalidity occurs. This, notably, is the path the Court took in the domain of state
legislative reapportionment. In a line of cases between 1967 and 1975, the Court
invalidated plans with total population deviations of 20%,182 26%,183 and 34%,184
while sustaining plans with deviations of 8%185 and 10%.186 It was only after this
doctrinal sequence had unfolded that the Court announced that “[w]e have come
to establish a rough threshold of 10% maximum deviation from equality.”187 In
the gerrymandering context, likewise, the efficiency gap thresholds could emerge
organically over a series of decisions. They need not be specified at the outset.
B. Presumptive Validity and Invalidity
Throughout our discussion to this point, we have spoken of presumptive
rather than irrebuttable validity and invalidity. We now unpack how we think
these presumptions should operate. In our view, a state whose plan’s efficiency

The plans’ efficiency gaps are depicted in Section III.C, supra.
A variant of this approach might be applied historically as well, examining (1) whether a plan had an
average efficiency gap of more than two seats or eight points over its lifespan; and (2) whether a plan’s
efficiency gap ever crossed the zero axis during the decade. In the 2000s, for example, the California, Florida,
Illinois, and first Texas congressional plans would have failed this test, along with the Florida, Ohio, and
Vermont state house plans.
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Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 852 (1983); see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977)
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gap exceeds the relevant threshold should have the chance to argue that the gap
either was the necessary result of a legitimate and consistently applied state
policy, or was inevitable given the state’s underlying political geography. The
plaintiff then could respond by showing that a plan with a smaller gap could have
been drawn while still attaining the state’s goals (or notwithstanding the state’s
political geography). If a state successfully meets its burden, and the plaintiff
fails to refute the state’s position, then the presumption of unconstitutionality
would be rebutted.
But before elaborating on litigants’ potential claims and ripostes under this
framework, it is worth asking why plans with efficiency gaps above the
thresholds should not be automatically invalid. One answer is that Justices have
suggested in multiple gerrymandering cases that the pursuit of proper
redistricting goals may save plans that fail to treat the parties equally. For
instance, Justice Stevens commented in Karcher that, “[a]lthough a scheme in
fact worsens the voting position of a particular group . . . it will nevertheless be
constitutionally valid if the State can demonstrate that the plan as a whole
embodies acceptable, neutral objectives.”188 Similarly, Justice Souter argued in
Vieth that if a plaintiff satisfies a five-part prima facie test, then the burden
should shift to the state “to justify [its] decision by reference to objectives other
than naked partisan advantage.”189
Another doctrinal answer comes from the state reapportionment cases, where
the Court repeatedly has upheld plans with population deviations above ten
percent that resulted from policies of respecting town and county boundaries.190
By analogy, plans with efficiency gaps above two seats or eight points should be
sustained too, as long as the gaps were the product of comparable state policies.
On the merits as well, we believe that a rule of automatic invalidity for plans with
excessive gaps would assign too high a premium to partisan fairness. Partisan
fairness is indeed a redistricting value of paramount importance. But it is not the
only important value implicated by redistricting, and we do not see why it should
be given doctrinal pride of place over compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, competitiveness, minority
representation, and the like.
These other values capture precisely the sorts of interests that states might
assert as justifications for plans with efficiency gaps above the thresholds. States
might argue that plans with smaller gaps simply could not have been drawn while

188
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 759-60 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 760 (“The
same kinds of justification that the Court accepts as legitimate in the context of population disparities would
also be available . . . .”).
189
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 351 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. (listing “need to avoid
racial vote dilution,” “one person, one vote,” and “proportional representation” as legitimate state objectives).
190
See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 843 (1983) (upholding district with population 60% below
mean because it was perfectly congruent with county); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) (upholding
Virginia plan with total population deviation of 16% that was attributable to “policy of maintaining the integrity
of political subdivision lines”); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971) (upholding county plan with total
population deviation of 12% caused by “preserving an exact correspondence between each town and one of the
county legislative districts”).
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complying with the Voting Rights Act or keeping districts sufficiently compact,
competitive, or congruent with subdivisions or communities. In making such
claims, states presumably would rely heavily on cartographic evidence, since
only actual district maps can reveal the extent of the tradeoff between partisan
fairness and other redistricting goals. States also could point to academic studies
indicating, among other things, that compactness is negatively correlated with
partisan fairness,191 and that the creation of majority-minority districts may lead
to partisan distortion too.192
Of course, a mere assertion that a large efficiency gap followed inexorably
from the application of a legitimate state policy would fail to rebut the
presumption of unconstitutionality. A state would have to present concrete proof
that its objectives could not have been realized to the same extent had it devised a
plan with a smaller gap. And even if the state presented such proof, the plaintiff
would get its bite at the apple as well. The plaintiff could submit sample maps
showing that the state’s goals could have been advanced equally well by a more
symmetric plan. To the extent academic evidence is probative, the plaintiff also
could highlight findings that congruence with subdivisions and with communities
is associated with greater partisan fairness,193 and that if they are drawn
correctly, majority-minority districts need not have any partisan implications.194
It then would be the court’s responsibility to determine whether the state’s
legitimate policy choices in fact necessitated an efficiency gap above the
threshold.195
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See, e.g., Chen & Rodden, supra note 20, at 264 (finding that simulated district plans based on
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The second kind of argument a state could make is that no smaller efficiency
gap was possible because of the state’s underlying political geography.196 The
state may have wanted to enact a plan with a gap below the threshold, the claim
would go, but this goal was unattainable due to the spatial distribution of the
parties’ supporters. Cartographic evidence again would be crucial in making this
case, preferably in the form of maps showing that a smaller gap simply could not
have been produced. A state also could cite recent work by political scientists
showing that “in many urbanized states, Democrats are highly clustered in dense
central city areas, while Republicans are scattered more evenly through the
suburban, exurban, and rural periphery.”197 These residential patterns mean that
“pro-Republican bias can be quite pronounced even in the absence of intentional
gerrymandering.”198
For its part, a plaintiff would aim to draw a sample map illustrating that a
smaller efficiency gap in fact was possible (despite the state’s political
geography). The map would need not only to feature a smaller gap, but also to
comply with all federal and state legal requirements. But if it could be crafted,
then the state’s inevitability argument would collapse. Notably, the same political
scientists that have documented the edge Republicans enjoy because of their
superior spatial distribution also have given advice to Democrats about how to
compensate for their weaker position. “[A] clever Democratic cartographer might
generate radial districts emanating from the city centers so as to break up the
major agglomerations . . . . Such a . . . districting arrangement would possibly
neutralize the inherent Republican advantages in geographic districting.”199 As
long as this sort of map actually could be produced, the presumption of
unconstitutionality would not be rebutted.
This doctrinal framework, with its quantitative thresholds and rebuttable
presumptions, may seem overly complex. But it is more or less identical to—and,
indeed, inspired by—the Court’s approach to one person, one vote cases at the
state legislative level. That approach has been used for decades without
prompting any claims that it is judicially unmanageable.200 And we see no reason
why it would prove less workable in the gerrymandering context. The substantive
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issue would be different, but the logic of the cause of action would remain the
same.
C. Concerns and Responses
We noted earlier that Justice Kennedy voiced a series of concerns about
partisan symmetry in LULAC.201 Does the efficiency gap test that we have set
forth respond adequately to these concerns? As we explain below, we believe
that it does. We also believe that it addresses the worry, expressed by the Court
in both Bandemer and Vieth, that shifting voter preferences might erode the
durability of any gerrymander.
Justice Kennedy’s first misgiving about partisan symmetry was that it “may
in large part depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers . . .
reside.”202 This critique, however, applies only to the particular measure of
partisan symmetry—partisan bias—that was cited in LULAC by Justice Stevens
and by the political scientist amici. It does not apply to all partisan symmetry
metrics, and in particular it does not apply to the efficiency gap. As we described
earlier, to calculate a plan’s partisan bias, it is necessary to estimate the results of
a hypothetical election in which the parties’ vote shares flip (or are both equal to
fifty percent).203 The only way to estimate these hypothetical results is by
assuming that the parties’ vote shares shift by the same amount in each district.204
But, as Justice Kennedy correctly observed, this assumption is problematic.
Vote-switchers are unlikely to reside in each district in the same proportions,
meaning that the partisan swing from district to district is unlikely to be uniform.
The efficiency gap avoids the need to estimate hypothetical election results
(and, with it, the need to speculate about vote-switchers’ locations). The parties’
respective wasted votes are calculated using actual election outcomes. No vote
shares are shifted in any direction.205 It is true that the sensitivity testing we
recommend relies on a methodology similar to that of partisan bias.206 But the
testing is not used to generate our point estimates of the efficiency gap, nor is it
used in our historical analysis of district plans. Moreover, even for contemporary
plans, the vote share shifts we employ are smaller than those typically needed to
compute partisan bias.207 And there is no reason why a litigant could not use an
assumption other than uniform swing to conduct sensitivity testing, so long as the
alternative premise was justified with an argument about the political realities on
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the ground. In short, while uniform swing is an option for the efficiency gap, it is
a prerequisite for partisan bias.
Second, Justice Kennedy was hesitant about striking down a district plan
before an election had taken place and demonstrated the plan’s partisan
unfairness. “[W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a
map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.
Presumably such a challenge could be litigated if and when the feared inequity
arose.”208 This objection also does not apply to the doctrinal framework we have
laid out. We have used only past election outcomes—not predicted future ones—
to calculate the efficiency gap. If courts were to refer to our data in
gerrymandering cases, they would be relying on “unfair results” derived not from
“a hypothetical state of affairs” but rather from actual historical experience.209
Of course, since election outcomes can be forecast with reasonable accuracy,
it would be reckless for political actors to enact plans with expected efficiency
gaps above the thresholds. Even if these plans were immune from scrutiny prior
to the first election held under them, they would be highly susceptible to
invalidation immediately thereafter. And if the plans were discarded at this
juncture, then so too might be many of the actors’ redistricting aims. Not only
would the plans’ partisan skew disappear, but communities might be destabilized,
competitiveness might surge, and incumbents might be imperiled (especially if
the remedy took the form of a court-drawn map). To avoid such scenarios, we
think political actors would be quite likely to design plans with sub-threshold
efficiency gaps from the outset. Even if the threat of litigation was an election
cycle away, it still would be proximate enough to produce compliance in most
cases.210
Third, Justice Kennedy did not see how, in the absence of empirical
evidence, “a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much”
could be chosen.211 But providing extensive data about the efficiency gap, and
then showing how it could be used to select a legal threshold, are perhaps the two
most important contributions of this Article. In the Article’s empirical portion,
we calculated the efficiency gap for congressional and state house plans over the
entire modern redistricting era.212 And earlier in this section, we explained how
the current plans’ efficiency gap distributions, in combination with historical
analysis, sensitivity testing, and analogies to the Court’s reapportionment
doctrine, could be deployed to set the crucial levels.213 Scholars and judges may
quibble about our two-seat threshold for congressional plans and our eight-point
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threshold for state house plans,214 but it seems hard to deny that they are
reasonable measures of “how much partisan dominance is too much.”215
Justice Kennedy’s fourth objection was that “asymmetry alone is not a
reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”216 In other words, the standard
for unlawful gerrymandering should incorporate both asymmetry and other
relevant considerations. The test we have proposed, of course, does exactly that.
In the first stage of the analysis, only asymmetry (in the form of the efficiency
gap) would be at issue. The key question would be whether the plan’s gap is
above or below the relevant threshold. But in the second stage, all sorts of other
factors—redistricting criteria such as compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest, democratic values such as
competitiveness and minority representation, the state’s underlying political
geography, etc.—would come into play. Here the dispositive issue would be
whether these other factors necessitated a gap above the threshold. Under this
two-step sequence, partisan fairness would not be prioritized above every
competing consideration. Rather, it would be balanced against them, and could
be compromised in order to achieve other pressing objectives.217
Finally, we address the concern, voiced by the Court in both Bandemer and
Vieth, that voters’ preferences may be highly volatile, in which case partisan
unfairness in one election might not translate into unfairness in the next. As the
Court remarked in Bandemer, “a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported
by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters.”218 Or
as the Court put it in Vieth, “Political affiliation is not an immutable
characteristic.”219 Unlike all other standards proposed to date,220 our test
explicitly takes into account the possibility that voters’ attitudes may change over
time. Thanks to the sensitivity testing we recommend, a plan would be
presumptively unlawful only if its efficiency gap exceeded the threshold and the
gap was unlikely to hit zero over the plan’s lifetime. Moreover, the odds of the
gap hitting zero are determined not by speculation but rather on the basis of
historical evidence about the shifts in voter sentiment that can be expected to
occur over the course of a decade. These aspects of our test distinguish it from all
of the approaches the Court previously has considered and rejected, and render it
uniquely responsive to the Court’s anxiety about fickle voter preferences.
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CONCLUSION
The cause of action for partisan gerrymandering has lain dormant for
essentially its entire existence. In LULAC, however, the Court hinted for the first
time in a generation that the claim could yet arise from its slumber. In particular,
a majority of the Justices expressed genuine interest in the concept of partisan
symmetry. In this Article, we have taken the Court at its word. We have
introduced a new measure of partisan symmetry, the efficiency gap, that captures
the essence of gerrymandering and is superior to earlier symmetry metrics. We
also have calculated the efficiency gap for a vast array of congressional and state
house plans over the past five redistricting cycles. And, perhaps most helpfully
for the judiciary, we have developed one option for converting the efficiency gap
into usable doctrine. Notably, our proposal gives a concrete reply to Vieth’s
“unanswerable question” of “how much political . . . effect is too much”—a gap
of two seats for congressional plans and a gap of eight percent for state house
plans, but only if the gaps are likely to be durable.221
What are the odds, then, that the courts will finally put some teeth into
gerrymandering claims? Certainly the need for a more potent doctrine has never
been greater. As we have stressed, today’s plans feature the largest efficiency
gaps recorded in modern history. At the Supreme Court level, however, we doubt
that the currently sitting Justices are eager to launch another redistricting
revolution. We would be surprised by an explicit rejection of the efficiency gap,
given the Justices’ positive comments in LULAC, but we would be equally
surprised if today’s conservative Court began striking down the largely proRepublican gerrymanders that exist across the country. The Court’s more likely
course is to let sleeping dogs lie.
But we are substantially more optimistic at the lower court level. In the years
since LULAC, plaintiffs have lost their gerrymandering suits because they have
ignored the Court’s discussion of partisan symmetry and sought in vain to revive
the standards rebuffed in Vieth. It would not take much—just a single resourceful
plaintiff and a single creative court—for a test based on the efficiency gap to win
a doctrinal foothold. And from this foothold it also would not be too implausible
for the test to spread to other jurisdictions. Doctrinal experimentation and
diffusion are common in election law,222 and we see no reason why they could
not occur in the gerrymandering context too. And if they did occur, and if they
were perceived as positive developments, and if the Supreme Court’s
membership shifted in a favorable direction (all admittedly big ifs), then partisan
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symmetry might eventually be adopted as the law of the land. Then the promise
of LULAC, the promise that motivated us to write this Article, might be fulfilled.
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